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ABSTRACT 
WHO WANTS TO BE A TEACHER? 
ESSAYS ON EDUCATION POLICY AND TEACHER SUPPLY 
BY 
  MAHMOUD ABDUH ALI ELSAYED 
August 2018 
Committee Chair: Dr. Christine H. Roch 
Major Department: Public Management and Policy 
Enrollment in education programs has declined substantially in the U.S. over the last few 
decades, but little empirical evidence addresses the factors driving this decline. This dissertation 
examines two potential factors, whether government policies such as school accountability and 
teacher prep performance assessment have discouraged individuals from pursuing teaching as a 
career. 
The first chapter introduces the dissertation and summarizes the key findings. The second 
chapter tests the effects of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) on individuals’ decisions to enter the 
teaching profession. Opponents of NCLB, and of school accountability systems in general, argue 
that these systems undermine teaching as a stable and attractive career, discouraging individuals 
from becoming teachers. I examine whether NCLB has affected enrollment and degrees awarded 
in education programs. Using a Difference-in-Differences (DID) design, I compare enrollments 
and degrees awarded in education programs in states with accountability systems prior to NCLB 
to the same outcomes in states without prior accountability systems, before and after the 
introduction of NCLB. The results suggest that NCLB has had little or no effect on either 
enrollment or degrees awarded in education programs. However, NCLB significantly reduced 
minority enrollment in education programs by more than 3 percentage points. 
The third chapter investigates whether imposing new performance assessment 
requirements on teacher candidates in education programs affects their college outcomes. 
Starting from September 2015, Georgia required all teacher candidates to pass a teacher 
performance assessment exam in order to be certified. This chapter examines whether these 
requirements affect students’ persistence in college, attrition from education programs, or the 
likelihood of graduating within four years. The findings indicate that teacher prep performance 
assessment has little or no impact on college outcomes of students in education programs relative 
to other students. 
The fourth chapter examines the demographic characteristics and career paths of former 
teachers. I also explore the factors that affect former teachers’ decisions to return to teaching. 
Although former teachers represent an important source of teacher supply in the U.S., little 
attention has been paid to understanding the decisions of former teachers to re-enter teaching. 
Using restricted-use data that follows a cohort of new teachers for five years after starting their 
careers, I find that former teachers who work in large schools, high schools, and schools with 
large percentages of minority students are less likely to return to teaching after their initial exit. 
Teachers who left schools because of pregnancy or change in residence are more likely to re-
enter the profession. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Research on teacher labor markets has largely focused on how to identify and retain high 
quality teachers (2005a, Dee and Wyckoff 2015, Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin 2004a, Podgursky, 
Monroe, and Watson 2004a). Students’ demographic and socio-economic characteristics and 
schools’ working conditions are key determinants of teacher mobility and retention. Hanushek et 
al. (2004a), for example, found that schools with large numbers of minority and academically 
disadvantaged students tend to lose a substantial fraction of teachers each year. Loeb et al. 
(2005) also found that teacher salaries, class size, school resources, and other working conditions 
are strong predictors of teacher turnover (See also Boyd et al. 2005a, 2005b, Scafidi, Sjoquist, 
and Stinebrickner 2007). 
How to encourage more individuals to enter (or re-enter) the teaching profession has 
received less attention. This is surprising for several reasons. First, the supply of new teachers 
has declined significantly over the last few years. Between 2008-09 and 2014-15, enrollment in 
teacher preparation programs declined by 42 percent (U.S. Department of Education 2016). High 
school students are showing less interest in pursuing teaching as a career: only 5 percent of high 
school students who took the ACT exam in 2014 expressed an interest in education majors, a 
dramatic drop from 34 percent in 2010 (ACT 2015). 
This has major implications for teacher quality, student achievement, and schools’ hiring 
practices. The reduction in teacher supply will negatively affect student learning, especially in 
hard-to-staff subjects, such as math and science, which are most affected by teacher shortages. 
Fears of teacher shortages may make principals less willing to dismiss low-performing teachers 
(Bruno 2015). Second, the demand for teachers is expected to grow due to both high teacher 
attrition and increasing school enrollment. About 8 percent of the teaching workforce exits 
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annually, which puts pressure on schools to hire new teachers. The school-going population 
should increase by 3 million students in the next decade. 
Third, over the last few years, several states have introduced reforms that raise the bar to 
become a teacher. Some of these reforms target teacher candidates by imposing new 
requirements on teacher certification and licensure, while other reforms focus on improving the 
transparency and accountability of teacher preparation programs (Boyd et al. 2007, CCSSO Task 
Force on Educator Preparation and Entry into the Profession Members 2012, Goldhaber, Cowan, 
and Theobald 2016, Teacher Preparation Task Force 2012, U.S. Department of Education 2011). 
The purpose of these reforms is to improve the preparation and quality of teacher candidates, 
increase the transparency of teacher preparation programs, and hold these programs accountable 
for the performance of their graduates in the classroom. Despite growing concerns about teacher 
preparation programs among educators and policymakers, little evidence addresses the effect of 
teacher preparation reforms on the outcomes of teacher candidates. A few studies have examined 
the effect of these programs on teacher quality (Boyd et al. 2009, Koedel et al. 2015, Mihaly et 
al. 2012), but little looks at whether changing program requirements affect students’ decisions to 
enter, persist, or graduate from these programs. 
Understanding the supply decisions of prospective teachers is important for addressing 
the expected increase in teacher demand, especially given that new entrants represent a large 
share of new hires in schools. In 2007-08, for example, more than 42 percent of new hires were 
new entrants,1 including recent graduates and returning teachers. 
                                                          
1 During the same year, new entrants represented 6 percent of all teachers. New hires are teachers who weren’t 
working in their current school the previous year. This includes two main categories: transfers and new entrants. 
Transfers are teachers who transferred from within or outside the school district whereas new entrants include both 
individuals who either teach for the first time and former teachers who are returning to the profession.  
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This dissertation examines how two government policies (school accountability and pre-
service performance assessment) affect decisions to enter the teaching profession. The second 
chapter examines whether school accountability systems have affected students’ decisions to 
enter the teaching profession. Many states have adopted school accountability systems that 
emphasize standardized testing, evaluate teachers based on students’ test scores, and link teacher 
pay to student performance. The push for school accountability reached its highest point with the 
passage of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2002. This chapter examines whether the 
introduction of the NCLB has discouraged individuals from pursuing a career in teaching, using 
data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) combined with state-
level data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). 
Proponents of school accountability argue that these systems incentivize administrators 
and teachers to improve student achievement and provide an independent source of information 
that helps policy makers identify low-performing schools and parents make better decisions 
about where to send their children (Figlio and Loeb 2011). Opponents of school accountability 
argue that these systems set unrealistic expectations for schools and put pressure on teachers to 
enhance student performance, which may negatively impact teacher morale and undermine the 
perception of teaching as a stable career (Byrd-Blake et al. 2010, Heinrich 2015, Ladd 2017). 
I take advantage of the fact that some states had implemented school accountability 
systems prior to the introduction of the NCLB to employ a Difference-in-Differences (DID) 
design to compare enrollment and degrees awarded in education programs in states with prior 
accountability systems to the same outcomes in states without prior accountability systems, 
before and after the introduction of the NCLB in 2002. The results from this essay suggest that 
NCLB had no impact on either enrollment or degrees awarded in education programs, but did 
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reduce minority enrollment by more than 3 percentage points. One possible explanation is that 
minority teachers, who tend to work in schools with large shares of disadvantaged students, 
might have been discouraged by the severe consequences of NCLB on these schools. In addition, 
the opportunity costs of becoming a teacher are higher for minority college students than other 
students. That is, because of the small share of minority students who attend college, minority 
college students may have better employment and career opportunities aside from teaching 
(Ingersoll et al., 2017). Therefore, by increasing the costs of becoming a teacher, NCLB has 
disproportionately affected enrollment of minority students. 
The third chapter examines whether imposing new requirements on candidates in 
education programs affects their college outcomes. Both the federal and state governments 
introduced policies to improve the quality of teacher preparation programs. Starting in 2015, for 
example, all teacher candidates who apply for certification in Georgia must pass a performance-
based, subject-specific assessment called edTPA, which is designed to assess the knowledge and 
skills of prospective teachers. The new edTPA performance assessment has also been 
implemented or considered for implementation in 16 other states. 
Using administrative data from the University System of Georgia (USG), I examine 
whether the introduction of these new performance requirements affected college persistence and 
degree completion of students in education programs relative to other students. The USG data 
includes information on students who started their postsecondary education in Georgia between 
academic years 2008-09 and 2016-17. I estimate the effect of performance assessment on three 
main outcomes: college persistence, attrition from education programs, and the likelihood of 
graduating within 4 years. Using a Differences-in-Differences design, I compare college 
outcomes of students with education major to the same outcomes for students with other majors, 
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before and after 2015. Teacher prep performance assessment has little or no effect on students’ 
college persistence, attrition from education majors, or the likelihood of graduating within four 
years. 
The fourth chapter focuses on a non-traditional source of teacher supply: former teachers. 
A large literature on the career choices of current teachers (e.g., Boyd et al. 2005b, Hanushek, 
Kain, and Rivkin 2004b) suggests that student socio-economic characteristics, schools’ working 
conditions, and teacher qualifications and quality are key determinants of teacher mobility and 
attrition. Teachers are also more likely to leave schools with large shares of low-income and 
minority students. 
Despite the large literature on teacher labor market, only few studies have examined the 
career choices of former teachers and the factors that affect their decisions to return to the 
profession. Former teachers represent an important source of teacher supply in the United States. 
For example, according to the School and Staffing Survey (SASS), former teachers represented 
49 percent of teachers entering the teaching workforce in school year 2011-12, up from 37 
percent in 2007-08 (Sutcher, Darling-Hammond, and Carver-Thomas 2016). 
In this chapter, I examine the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of former 
teachers. I also explore the reasons that led former teachers to leave their profession, their career 
paths after their initial exit, and the factors that affect their decisions to return to teaching. To 
examine these questions, I rely on restricted-use data from the Beginning Teacher Longitudinal 
Study (BTLS) administered by the U.S. Department of Education. The BLTS follows a cohort of 
first-time teachers for five years, starting from the school year 2007-08. To explore the factors 
that affect the decisions for former teachers to reenter teaching, I use a discrete time hazard 
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model that estimates the probability that an individual returns to teaching in a given year 
conditional on not having returned in the previous year. 
Former teachers who work in large schools, high schools, and schools with large 
percentages of minority students are less likely to return to teaching after their initial exit. 
Results also show that high-paid teachers are more likely to re-enter teaching. A one thousand 
dollar increase in school salary increases the likelihood of returning to teaching by 0.5 
percentage points. The findings also indicate that teachers who left schools because of pregnancy 
or change in residence are also more likely to re-enter the profession. 
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Chapter II: The Effect of School Accountability on Teacher Supply 
2.1 Introduction 
Enrollment in teacher preparation programs has declined over the last two decades. 
Between 2000 and 2015, the number of individuals attending education programs in the U.S. 
decreased by 37 percent (U.S. Department of Education 2016). The factors driving the decline in 
teacher supply are still largely unknown. One potential explanation attracting increasing 
attention, however, is the increase in school accountability by federal and state governments 
(Berryhill, Linney, and Fromewick 2009). Over the last two decades, many states have adopted 
school accountability systems that emphasize standardized testing and evaluation of teachers 
based on students’ test scores. The push for school accountability reached its high point with the 
passage of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2002. NCLB required states to assess the 
performance of students in reading and mathematics in grades 3 through 8. The law also required 
states to identify poorly performing schools based on the degree to which students within these 
schools, in aggregate and by subgroup, achieved adequate progress towards complete proficiency 
(Figlio and Loeb 2011). 
The rationale behind NCLB, and school accountability systems in general, is fourfold 
(Figlio and Loeb 2011, Ladd 2017). First, proponents of NCLB argue that it provides increased 
incentives for educators to enhance student achievement. The empirical evidence on the effects 
of NCLB on student achievement, however, is mixed. A number of studies have found small 
positive effects of NCLB on student performance (Ballou, Springer, and Urban 2009, Dee and 
Jacob 2011, Ladd and Lauen 2010), though some other studies found no effects or negative 
effects on the performance of at least some groups of students (Lee 2006, Neal and 
Schanzenbach 2010). 
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Second, NCLB, and accountability systems in general provide policymakers, parents, and 
the general public with a valuable source of information regarding the performance of 
schools/teachers. This information enables policy makers to identify low-performing schools and 
helps parents make better decisions regarding where to send their children to school. Third, 
school accountability systems hold schools and teachers accountable not only for the 
performance of students in aggregate but also for the performance of specific subgroups of 
students who might otherwise be ignored by schools. As a result, these systems provide 
incentives to schools to focus on enhancing the performance of disadvantaged students in 
addition to reducing the achievement gap between advantaged and disadvantaged students. 
Fourth, School accountability may have positive effects on teacher labor supply. To the extent 
that high-quality teachers benefit from pay for performance systems that reward success in the 
classroom or help them avoid working with poorly prepared colleagues, school accountability 
may encourage highly talented individuals to enter the teaching profession. 
However, opponents of school accountability raise some concerns about the potentially 
negative consequences of school accountability on schools, students, and teachers (Hill and 
Barth 2004, Santoro 2011). Ladd (2017), for example, argues that school accountability systems, 
especially NCLB, adopt a very narrow view of schooling that emphasizes standardized testing 
and overlooks other aspects of teaching that are hard to test/quantify. This narrow view of 
schooling, according to this view, may provide incentives to schools to shift their resources 
towards tested subjects, ignoring other areas of schooling.  For instance, several studies have 
shown that, in response to accountability pressures, schools tend to increase their instructional 
time in tested subjects, such as math and English while reducing time for other subjects such as 
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social studies, science, and art and music (Au 2009, CEP 2006, Ladd 2017, McMurrer 2007, 
Smith and Kovacs 2011) 
Opponents of school accountability also argue that these systems set unrealistic 
expectations for students and put more pressure on teachers and schools without providing them 
with enough support needed to improve student outcomes. The pressure on schools and teachers 
to enhance student performance may result in adverse effects on teacher morale and satisfaction 
(Byrd-Blake et al. 2010, Ladd 2017, Smith and Kovacs 2011). Evidence from teachers’ surveys 
and interviews suggests that teachers’ stress and anxiety have been on the rise during the last two 
decades. Half of teachers (51 percent) reported feeling under great stress several days a week in 
2012 compared to 36 percent in 1985 and the number of teachers saying they are satisfied with 
their jobs declined by 23 percentage points between 2008 and 2012, from 62 percent to 39 
percent (Markow, Pieters, and Interactive 2012). 
School accountability pressures may also lead schools to engage in strategies that 
artificially improve student performance. Prior research has shown that schools tend to respond 
to school accountability systems by focusing on students near the proficiency margin, i.e., those 
who are right below the proficiency cutoff score, while ignoring the most disadvantaged 
students, especially those at the bottom of the distribution (Ladd and Lauen 2010, Neal and 
Schanzenbach 2010). Neal and Schanzenbach (2010), for example, found that while NCLB has 
improved the performance of students in the middle of the achievement distribution, it had no 
effects on students at the bottom 20%. Schools may also respond to accountability systems by 
engaging in practices that reshape the testing pool, such as classifying low-achieving students as 
learning disabled or relying on school discipline to exclude low-performing students from the 
testing pool (Figlio and Loeb 2011, Figlio 2006, Figlio and Getzler 2006, Hanushek and 
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Raymond 2005, Jacob 2005, Jacob and Levitt 2003, Ladd 2017). Figlio (2006) found that 
schools respond to high-stakes standardized exams by selectively disciplining their students. His 
findings suggest that schools tend to punish low-performing students in testing grades more 
harshly than high-performing students around the time of testing. 
Opponents of school accountability systems, particularly NCLB, argue that the negative 
consequences of these systems on teachers and schools, in general, are responsible for the 
decline in the supply of teachers. First, according to this view, school accountability undermines 
the job security of teachers by linking teacher hiring and tenure decisions to student performance 
on standardized exams. Second, school accountability reduces teachers’ autonomy in the 
classroom and negatively impact their teaching practices. A number of studies by the Center on 
Education Policy (CEP) found that schools have responded to NCLB by allocating more 
resources to tested subjects and aligning their curricula with state standards, diminishing teacher 
authority in the classroom (CEP 2006, 2007, 2008). The negative effects on teachers’ job 
security and autonomy increase teachers’ stress and dissatisfaction and undermine the perception 
of teaching as a stable career, which may discourage individuals from entering the teaching 
profession. 
Third, school accountability will also increase teacher turnover, especially in schools 
with large shares of poor and minority students. Fourth, school accountability may affect teacher 
supply through the experiences of students in schools during the implementation of 
accountability systems. These experiences may shape students’ views about teaching as an 
attractive career. For example, students who attend disadvantaged schools are likely to be 
negatively affected by accountability systems and, as a result, they may develop a negative 
perception towards teaching as a career. Fifth, candidates in education programs may also 
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experience firsthand the negative consequences of accountability systems on teachers’ morale 
and satisfaction during their filed placements, which may affect their decisions to complete their 
education degrees. 
Due to all the previous reasons, many teachers, school officials and education advocates 
consider school accountability the key factor behind the decline in teacher supply. For instance, 
some education officials report accountability systems may have served to make teaching appear 
less stable and more political, discouraging future teachers from entering the teaching profession 
(Sawchuk and Yettick 2014). One official summarized the high-stakes test-based environment in 
which teachers work, “There’s a lot of teacher bashing…Do people want to enter careers where 
they feel they would be unfairly blamed?” (Cooper 2013). Westervelt (2015) concludes that 
teaching has become less attractive to potential teachers due to high stakes testing, evaluations 
that tie teachers to student performance, the Common Core, questionable tenure, and state budget 
issues. 
Despite the growing concerns that school accountability systems, and NCLB in 
particular, contribute to the decline in teacher supply, the evidence is limited. Little previous 
research has examined the relationship between NCLB and student enrollment in education 
programs. This lack of evidence is problematic given the large implications of the decline in 
teacher supply for the educational environment. As the supply of teachers declines, schools 
become increasingly challenged to find teachers in hard-to-staff STEM areas. Thus, schools may 
be short-staffed in critical areas, limiting their ability to grow the science and technology 
12 
 
workforce, and leading a growing number of districts to employ teachers holding emergency 
certificates2 (Sawchuk and Yettick 2014). 
In this chapter, I examine the effects of school accountability, particularly NCLB, on 
students’ decisions to enter the teaching profession. Using panel data from the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), I investigate whether the introduction of NCLB 
in 2002 affected enrollment and number of degrees awarded in education programs. I also 
explore whether the effects of school accountability are different across subgroups of students in 
education programs, especially minority students. Prior research has shown that minority 
individuals are underrepresented in both the teaching workforce and education programs. In 
2012, for example, minority teachers represented 18 percent of all public school teachers, 
whereas minority students accounted for 49 percent of all students in public schools.3 The extent 
to which school accountability affects the decisions of minority students to attend or complete 
education programs has major policy implications for students and schools in the U.S. Prior 
research has shown that minority teachers have large positive effects on the outcomes of 
minority students (Dee 2004, Dee 2005, Gershenson, Holt, and Papageorge 2016). 
Although the NCLB was replaced in late 2015 with the Every Student Succeeds Act 
(ESSA), the ESSA maintains most of the key features of NCLB such as standardized testing and 
holding schools accountable for the performance of their students. If NCLB decreased the supply 
of teachers in the last decade, ESSA is unlikely to reverse these effects. Further, if NCLB was 
the main factor behind the decline in enrollment in education programs, then efforts to attract 
                                                          
2 To address teacher shortage, some states have issued emergency teaching certificates to individuals who do not 
meet the standard requirements for state certification. These individuals are allowed to teach in schools for a limited 
period of time while working on completing the state certification requirements. 
3 During the same year, minority individuals represented 20.2 percent of the civilian labor workforce (U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics 2013). 
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new teachers to the profession by improving aspects of teaching such as salary or working 
conditions may not be sufficient to increase teacher supply. This finding would also suggest that, 
when designing accountability policies similar to NCLB, educators and policymakers should 
take into account the effects of these policies not only on teacher quality and retention but also 
its effects on teacher supply. 
Following Dee & Jacob (2011), Dee et al. (2013), and Grissom et al. (2014), I take 
advantage of the fact that some states implemented school accountability systems prior to the 
introduction of NCLB while other states had not. I employ a Difference-in-Differences (DID) 
design in which I compare teacher supply in states with prior accountability systems to the same 
outcome in states without prior accountability systems, before and after the introduction of the 
NCLB. The results suggest that NCLB has had no significant impact on either enrollment or 
degrees awarded in education programs. However, there is some evidence that NCLB has 
significantly reduced minority enrollment in education programs by more than 3 percentage 
points. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Over the last few decades, policy-makers have increasingly sought to increase the levels 
of accountability in public schools. Many of these systems rely on incentives and sanctions that 
encourage schools to improve student performance, which is largely measured through student 
test scores (Clotfelter et al. 2004, Figlio and Loeb 2011). The NCLB Act, signed in 2002 and 
replaced in December 2015 by ESSA, was the most significant federal initiative focused on 
increasing accountability. NCLB required schools to test students in reading and math to 
determine whether they were making adequate yearly progress (AYP) towards proficiency in 
these subjects. Schools that received Title 1 funding, i.e., schools with large shares of low-
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income students, received increasingly severe sanctions if they failed to meet these goals; some 
states also extended these sanctions to all schools (Dee and Jacob 2011). 
These accountability policies are intended to motivate teachers and administrators to 
change their behavior in ways that would benefit students academically (Hanushek and Raymond 
2001). However, the empirical evidence on whether NCLB has improved student achievement is 
inconclusive. Some studies have found positive impacts of NCLB on student performance, 
especially in math. For instance, Dee and Jacob (2011) and Wong, Cook, and Steiner (2009) 
found that NCLB has improved student achievement in the fourth and eighth grades. Neal and 
Schanzenbach (2010) also found positive effects of NCLB on students in the middle of the 
achievement distribution but not on students at the bottom of the distribution. Other studies, 
however, have found no effects of NCLB on student performance (Lee 2006). 
Prior research has also shown that NCLB, and school accountability policies in general, 
may result in adverse effects on schools and teachers. Several studies found that the increased 
emphasis on standardized testing has caused schools to act strategically in order to maximize 
students’ test score, e.g., by ignoring non-tested subjects, manipulating the testing pool, or 
focusing on students near proficiency levels (Jacob 2005, Murnane and Papay 2010, Reback 
2008). School accountability pressures have also led some teachers and school administrators in 
cities such as Atlanta and Chicago to manipulate students’ test scores (Aronson, Murphy, and 
Saultz 2016, Jacob 2005, Jacob and Levitt 2003). 
The evidence is mixed on whether school accountability has influenced teachers’ job-
related attitudes. Some interview and survey studies suggest that school accountability decreased 
teacher job satisfaction and commitment and increased burnout (Hill and Barth 2004, Santoro 
2011, Smith and Kovacs 2011). Barksdale-Ladd and Thomas (2000) interviewed 50 teachers and 
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20 parents from two states and found that teachers have negative perceptions towards 
accountability systems that emphasize standardized tests. Their findings suggest that 
standardized tests have increased teachers’ stress, forced teachers to adopt teach-to-the-test 
instruction, and undermined their job security. Using survey data from one school district, Smith 
and Kovac (2011) found that teachers are increasingly dissatisfied with the role that NCLB 
played in their work environments. Their results also suggest that teachers who were more 
concerned about the impact of NCLB were least to say that they would encourage others to enter 
the field and that they were considering leaving teaching. As summarized by one teacher, “If I 
could retire I would…and I do not advise anyone to choose teaching as a career. There are very 
little rewards. I used to love it!” (Smith and Kovacs 2011). Berryhill et al. (2009) also found, 
relying on responses from teachers in a suburban and urban school district, that accountability 
policies may increase job burnout because of increased role conflict and reduced self-efficacy. 
Byrd-Blake et al. (2010) found that teachers, especially at the elementary school level, felt that 
their morale had decreased after the implementation of NCLB. 
In contrast, some recent research conducted at a national level suggests that NCLB has 
had few negative effects on teachers’ attitudes. Grissom et al. (2014) found that NCLB had 
negative effects on the perceived levels of cooperation among teachers but positively influenced 
perceptions of classroom control and administrative support. The results from Grissom et al. 
(2014) may suggest that, contrary to the anecdotal evidence emphasizing the negative 
consequences of school accountability on teachers’ labor markets, NCLB may have limited 
effect on teacher supply. However, unlike student achievement, the evidence on the effects of 
NCLB on teacher labor markets is very limited. A number of studies, however, have examined 
the impact of state-level accountability systems on teacher mobility and retention and found 
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mixed results. Clotfelter et al. (2004) found that the introduction of state-level accountability 
systems has increased attrition among teachers in low-performing schools. Using national data 
from the Schools and Staffing Survey, Loeb and Cuhna (2007) exploit the state-level variation in 
the strength of school accountability systems to examine the effects of these systems on teacher 
attrition. Unlike Clotfelter et al. (2004), Loeb and Cuhna (2007) found no impact of school 
accountability on teacher turnover. 
2.3 Data 
To estimate the effect of NCLB on teacher supply, I use panel data from the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) for 1988-2016. IPEDS collects information on 
postsecondary institutions across the United States on a broad range of topics including type and 
level of institution, enrollment, completion rate, financial aid, and student characteristics. I 
combine the IPEDS data with data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) on state-level 
characteristics such as unemployment rate, state median wage, and teachers’ median wage 
(Flood et al. 2017). I also use the union membership database created by Hirsch et al. (2001) to 
control for union density within a state in a given year. Hirsch et al. (2001) provide national and 
state-level estimates of union membership density that are consistent across years.4 
Dependent variable. I estimate the effect of school accountability on teacher supply using 
two measures. The first is the percentage of all college students who major in education. This 
includes both part-time and full-time undergraduate students. The second measure is the 
percentage of all undergraduate degrees each year that are awarded to education students. 
                                                          
4 The database is available at http://www.unionstats.com/ and covers the years 1964 through 2017. Union 
membership density is measured using the percentage of non-agricultural wage and salary employees who are union 
members, including employees in the public sector.  
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Figure 1 displays shares of enrollment and degrees awarded in education programs 
between 1988 and 2016.  As shown, there was a substantial decline in enrollment in education 
programs between 1994 and 2016. The percentage of undergraduate students enrolled in 
education programs declined by 35 percent nationally, from 12 percent to 8 percent. Figure 1 
also shows a large decline in undergraduate degrees awarded in education programs between 
1988 and 2016. In 1988, 12.5 percent of all degrees awarded were in education; by 2016, it was 
only 6.3 percent, a 50 percent decrease. 
Independent variable. The key independent variable is school accountability. I measure 
school accountability using the 2002 introduction of NCLB. Following prior research (Dee and 
Jacob 2011, Dee, Jacob, and Schwartz 2013), I distinguish between states that implemented 
accountability systems prior to NCLB and states that didn’t.5 States with no prior accountability 
systems should be affected the most by the introduction of NCLB since these states were 
experiencing the consequences of school accountability for the first time. Therefore, I expect a 
decline in teacher supply after 2002 in states without prior accountability systems. This decline, 
however, is not expected to be immediate. The reason is that, during its early years, NCLB was 
not perceived negatively by many school officials and educators. In fact, many education 
advocates considered the law to be a positive step in the direction of reducing the achievement 
gap between advantaged and disadvantaged students. In addition, given the complexity of the 
NCLB, schools did not experience its negative consequences until after the first few years of 
implementation. In contrast, the trend in teacher supply in states with prior accountability 
systems should stay the same after 2002. 
                                                          
5 Table A1 in the appendix provides a list of states that implemented accountability systems prior to NCLB and the 
years during which these systems were implemented. 
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Figure 1: Shares of Enrollment and Degrees Awarded in Education Programs (1988-2016) 
Note: Enrollment in education programs is only available every two years starting from 1996. 
Unlike teacher supply, enrollment in public and elementary schools in the U.S. has 
increased substantially over the last three decades. As shown in Figure 2, the number of students 
enrolled in public schools has increased by 22.8 percent between 1990 and 2016, from 41 million 
students to 51 million.  
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Figure 2: Enrollment in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools (1990-2016) 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. Available at: 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_203.10.asp 
 
To estimate the effect of NCLB on teacher supply, I create two binary variables. The first 
binary variable, No prior accountability, takes on a value of 1 for states with no consequential 
school accountability systems prior to NCLB and zero otherwise.6 The second variable, NCLB, is 
coded as 1 for years that followed the implementation of the NCLB starting from 2002. The 
interaction term between these two binary variables, NCLB* No prior accountability, represents 
the measure for school accountability. This measure represents the differential effect of NCLB 
on teacher supply in states with no prior accountability systems. 
Control variables. To account for differences across postsecondary institutions, I include 
institution fixed effects in all models. The institution fixed effects, however, only control for 
characteristics of postsecondary institutions that are constant over time such as type and level of 
                                                          
6 I use the same list of states that were used by Dee and Jacob (2011) in their study on the effect of the NCLB on 
student achievement. 
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institution. Other time-variant characteristics that might affect enrollment and degrees awarded 
in education programs are not captured by the institution fixed effects. For example, the size and 
composition of the student body in a postsecondary institution are key determinants of 
enrollment in education programs. As prior research has shown, enrollment in education 
programs tends to high in large institutions and in institutions where white students represent the 
majority. In addition, economic conditions within a state are expected to affect teacher supply. 
States with high teachers’ wages, for instance, may provide students with incentives to enter the 
teaching profession. State unemployment rate and school-age population may also affect 
students’ decisions to enroll in education programs.  
To account for all these time-variant characteristics that might affect teacher supply, I 
control for several institution and state-level characteristics such as log enrollment, share of 
white students enrolled in the fall semester, percentage of students receiving Pell grant, state 
median wage, teacher median wage, unemployment rate, union membership, and school-age 
population. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the two samples used in the analysis: the 
enrollment sample and the education degrees sample. Although data on education degrees is 
available from 1988 to 2016, data on enrollment in education majors is only available every two 
years starting from 1996. Overall, 12 percent of students are enrolled in education programs 
while 10 percent of degrees are awarded in education programs. About 36.2 percent of 
postsecondary institutions in the enrollment sample are public institutions compared to 49.1 
percent for the education degrees sample.7 The median wage for teachers for the entire time 
                                                          
7 According to the U.S. Department of Education, there were 640 degree-granting public institutions with first-year 
undergraduates in 2011-12, which represents 25.1 percent all of degree-granting institutions (Snyder, Dillow, and 
National Center for Education 2013). 
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period is $28,000 compared a state median wage of $23,000 and a college median wage of 
$34,000 (all wages are adjusted for inflation using constant 2017 dollars).8 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Enrollment Sample Education Degrees Sample 
   
Institution-level characteristics   
   
Enrollment in education programs (%) 11.56 - 
 
(12.17) - 
   
Degrees awarded in education (%) - 10.38 
 
- (11.33) 
   
Log fall enrollment 7.89 7.88 
 
(1.20) (1.31) 
   
White enrollment (%) 68.41 68.36 
 
(24.76) (25.35) 
   
Pell grant (%) 1.72 2.43 
 
(8.91) (11.02) 
   
Public institutions (%) 36.20 49.34 
 (48.06) (50.00) 
   
State-level characteristics   
  
 
State median wage ($) $23,000 $22,779 
 
($2,638) ($2,840) 
   
Teacher median wage ($) $28,364 $28,469 
 
($4,285) ($4,359) 
   
College median wage ($) $33,987 $34,101 
 ($3,632) ($3,717) 
   
State unemployment rate (%) 6.13 6.20 
                                                          
8 Wage is measured using the total pre-tax wage and salary income during the previous year from all jobs (Flood et 
al. 2017). 
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(2.10) (2.09) 
   
Union membership density (%) 12.45 12.80 
 
(6.12) (6.36) 
   
School-age population (%) 19.54 19.50 
 
(1.48) (1.49) 
   
Sample size 11,512 38,335 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
2.4 Empirical Strategy 
I examine the effect of NCLB on teacher supply using a Difference-in-Differences 
approach (DID). This approach is similar to that used by Dee et al. (2013) and Grissom et al. 
(2014) to estimate the effect of NCLB on school resources and teachers’ work environments and 
attitudes, respectively. I estimate a separate equation for each measure of teacher supply: 
enrollment and degrees awarded in education programs. The DID design is estimated as follows. 
𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑁𝐶𝐿𝐵𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝑁𝐶𝐿𝐵𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠 +
 𝛽3 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑍𝑠𝑡 +  𝛾𝑡 +   𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                 (1) 
where 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 is measured using two variables: the percentage of undergraduate 
students enrolled in traditional education programs within institution i in state s in year t and the 
percentage of education degrees awarded to undergraduate students by institution i in state s in 
year t. 𝑁𝐶𝐿𝐵𝑡 is a binary variable that takes 1 for years that followed the implementation of the 
NCLB starting from 2002; 𝑁𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠 is a binary variable that is coded as 1 for 
states with no accountability systems prior to NCLB and zero otherwise;  𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a vector of 
institution-level characteristics such as percentage of white enrollment; 𝑍𝑠𝑡 is a vector of state-
level characteristics such as unemployment rate, median wage, union membership density, and 
teacher median wage; 𝛾𝑡 is a vector of year dummies, 𝜆𝑖 is institution-level fixed-effects; and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
is an error term. I estimate equation (1) using a panel data fixed effects model that controls for 
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time-invariant characteristics of post-secondary institutions. The standard errors are clustered at 
the state level. 
The effect of NCLB on teacher supply is measured using an interaction term between 
NCLB and N𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦. The coefficient on this interaction term, 𝛽2, represents the 
differential effect of the NCLB on teacher supply in states with no prior accountability systems. 
To the extent that the accountability requirements imposed by the NCLB resemble the systems 
adopted by states with prior consequential accountability, I expect the effect of NCLB to be 
greater among states with no prior accountability systems. That is, I expect a decline in both 
enrollment and degrees awarded in education programs in states without prior accountability 
systems after the introduction of NCLB in 2002. 
There are two key identification assumptions of the DID approach. The first is that school 
accountability systems that were in place prior to NCLB are similar to the accountability 
requirements imposed by NCLB. This suggests that, unlike states without prior accountability 
systems, NCLB should have very little effects on enrollment and degrees awarded in education 
in states with prior accountability systems. As a result, the trends in these outcomes in states with 
prior accountability systems should be similar to the pre-NCLB trend. Dee and Jacob (2011) and 
Dee et al. (2013) provide some evidence that supports this assumption. These studies compared 
the main features of the NCLB to state consequential accountability systems that existed prior to 
the introduction of the NCLB using a variety of sources including state-specific accountability 
and assessment profiles, annual surveys on state assessment programs, information from state 
department of education websites, and searches of state and local newspapers. They found that 
state accountability systems adopted prior to the NCLB “closely resemble the frameworks 
required under NCLB” (Dee and Jacob 2011, 425). 
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Second, the DID design assumes that changes in teacher supply in states with prior 
accountability systems and those without prior accountability systems follow the same trend. 
That is, in the absence of NCLB, the trend in teacher supply for the comparison group (states 
with prior accountability) represents a valid counterfactual for the trend in the treatment group 
(states without prior accountability). This assumption, which is known as the parallel trend 
assumption, would be violated, and therefore the DID estimator would be biased, if the outcome 
trends are different for the treatment and the comparison groups. That is, the “parallel trend 
assumption” would be violated if a) teacher supply in states within the treatment group is driven 
by changes in the local economy or state education policy or b) states within the treatment group 
respond differently to any macroeconomic changes that affect teacher supply, such as 
unemployment rate or federal financial aid. For example, if states with no prior accountability 
systems have implemented policies that focus on attracting new teachers, such as introducing 
alternative teacher certification programs, then the estimates from the DID model would 
underestimate the effect of NCLB on teacher supply. 
To address these issues, I conduct several robustness checks. First, I test the plausibility 
of the “parallel trend assumption” by examining the trend in teacher supply in states with and 
without prior accountability systems before the implementation of NCLB. If teacher supply 
follows the same trend in both groups of states before NCLB, then it is more likely that the trend 
after 2002 would have been similar, had NCLB not being implemented. That is, the differences 
in outcome trends after 2002 between states without prior accountability systems and states that 
implemented these systems prior to NCLB should be attributed only to the introducing of NCLB. 
Second, I include group-specific time trends in the DID models to account for any changes in 
teacher supply that were specific to either the treatment or the comparison groups. Specifically, I 
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include interaction terms between no prior accountability and a linear time trend. Third, over the 
last decade, several states have implemented new teacher evaluation systems that hold teachers 
accountable for the performance of their students (Steinberg and Donaldson 2016). These 
systems may affect the supply decisions of teacher candidates and, therefore, bias the effects of 
school accountability. To account for that, I control for whether a state has implemented a 
teacher evaluation reform during the time period of this study. I create a binary variable that is 
coded as 1 if a state implemented teacher evaluation reform in a given year and zero otherwise. 
Fourth, I account for the fact that the effect of the NCLB may vary across states based on 
its reliance on traditional education programs. I use data from the U.S. Department of Education 
on enrollment in both traditional and alternative programs in 2012 to identify states that rely 
heavily on traditional programs to train teachers, i.e., states where enrollment in traditional 
programs represent at least 90 percent of total enrollment in education programs. I then estimate 
the effect of NCLB on this group of states, excluding all other states where enrollment in 
traditional programs represent less than 90 percent of total enrollment in teacher preparation 
programs. 
In addition to the parallel trend assumption, the DID design assumes that the effects of 
NCLB on teacher supply are immediate. However, given the complexity of NCLB and the large 
scale changes that resulted from the law, teacher candidates may have taken years to understand 
NCLB and experience its effects on teachers and schools. For example, NCLB may have little, or 
even positive, effects on students who were attending education programs during the early stages 
of implementing the law. The reason is that, during these early stages, effects of NCLB on 
teacher and schools weren’t fully developed. For example, students may have lacked the 
information necessary to understand NCLB. In addition, individuals may have developed 
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positive attitudes towards the law given the overwhelming support of the law in the U.S. 
Congress during its early phases. To examine whether there were delayed effects of NCLB on 
teacher supply, I include three variables in the DID model that capture the 1-year, 2-year, and 3-
year lagged effects of NCLB. 
Finally, the DID model in equation (1) assumes that NCLB only affects the level (i.e., 
intercept) but not the trend in teacher supply (i.e., slope). To address this limitation, I create a 
new variable, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝐶𝐿𝐵𝑡, that represents the number of years since the NCLB was 
implemented. This variable is defined as year – 2002, with all years prior to NCLB are coded as 
zero. Then, I include this new variable, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝐶𝐿𝐵𝑡, and its interaction term with no 
prior accountable in the regression model.  The model is specified as follows. 
𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1 𝑁𝐶𝐿𝐵𝑡 +  𝛼2 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝐶𝐿𝐵𝑡  +
𝛼3 𝑁𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠 ∗  𝑁𝐶𝐿𝐵𝑡 +  𝛼4 𝑁𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠 ∗
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝐶𝐿𝐵𝑡 + 𝛼5 𝑁𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠 ∗  𝜑𝑡   +  𝛼7 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼8 𝑍𝑠𝑡 +  𝜑𝑡 +   𝛿𝑖 +
𝜐𝑖𝑡                          (2) 
where  𝑁𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠 ∗  𝜑𝑡 represents an interaction terms between no prior 
accountability and a linear time trend. The total effect of the NCLB, as of 2015, would be 𝛼3 + 
14 × 𝛼4. 
2.5 Results 
I begin the analysis by exploring the trend in teacher supply in states with and without 
accountability systems prior to NCLB. Figure 3 displays the trend in enrollment in education 
majors in both groups before and after the introduction of NCLB. I can see that, during the entire 
time period of the study, enrollment in education programs was greater in states with no prior 
accountability compared to other states. Figure 3 also shows that the trend in enrollment in 
education programs in both groups of states followed a similar pattern before the introduction of 
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NCLB. Between 1996 and 1998, for example, enrollment in education programs in states with 
and without prior accountability systems has been relatively stable.  However, between 1998 and 
2000, enrollment in education majors declined in both groups of states. The decline was steeper 
among states with prior accountability systems. Enrollment in education majors started to rise 
again in both groups between 2000 and 2002. For example, between 2000 and 2002, enrollment 
in education majors increased by 19.4 percent in states without prior accountability systems, 
compared to 14.2 percent for states with prior accountability. Figure 3 also shows that both 
groups of states experienced a long-term decline in enrollment in education majors starting after 
2002. 
 
Figure 3: Share of Enrollment in Education Majors Before and After NCLB (1996-2016) 
Figure 4 depicts the trend in education degrees in states with and without prior 
accountability systems. As shown, the trend in education degrees was almost identical in both 
groups of states before the introduction of the NCLB. In addition, the percentage of degrees 
awarded in education was relatively stable for most of the time period prior to the NCLB. 
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Starting from 2002, however, the percentage of degrees awarded in education started to decline, 
especially in states with prior accountability systems. 
 
Figure 4: Share of Degrees Awarded in Education Majors Before and After NCLB (1988-2016) 
2.5.1 Effects of NCLB on Teacher Supply 
Table 2 presents regression estimates for the effect of NCLB on enrollment in education 
majors. In all models, I include institution-level fixed-effects to account for time-invariant 
characteristics of postsecondary institutions that might affect students’ decisions to choose 
education as a major. I also include a set of year dummies to control for any changes over time 
that affect teacher supply.9 As shown in model 1, the coefficient on the interaction term between 
NCLB and 𝑁𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 is negative but cannot be distinguished from zero, which 
indicates that NCLB has no significant impact on enrollment in education majors. In models 2 
and 3, I account for the possibility that the trend in teacher supply might be different for states in 
the treatment and comparison groups. As I discussed in the methodology section, the DID model 
                                                          
9 The binary variables for NCLB and No prior accountability are omitted from the model because of institution and 
year fixed effects. 
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assumes that the trend in teacher supply in states with prior accountability systems represents a 
valid counterfactual for the trend in states without prior accountability systems. This assumption 
would be violated if teacher supply in states within the treatment or comparison groups is driven 
by changes in the local economy or state education policy. For example, if states with no prior 
accountability systems have adopted policies that focus on attracting new teachers, such as 
introducing alternative pathways to teaching, then the estimates from the DID model would 
underestimate the effect of the NCLB on teacher supply. To address this limitation, I include 
interaction terms between no prior accountability and linear and squared time trends to capture 
any group-specific trends that might have affected enrollment in education majors. As shown, 
controlling for group-specific time trends slightly change the magnitude of the coefficient on the 
interaction between NCLB and 𝑁𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 but it remains statistically 
insignificant. That is, the differential effect of NCLB on enrollment in education majors in states 
without prior accountability systems is positive but cannot be distinguished from zero. 
Table 2: Effects of NCLB on Enrollment in Education Majors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES      
            
NCLB* No prior 
accountability -0.1527 0.3173 0.3056 0.2765 0.2771 
 (0.5355) (0.6972) (0.5125) (0.5169) (0.8760) 
      
No prior accountability * 
years under NCLB    -0.0129 0.1637 
    (0.1587) (0.2790) 
      
Years under NCLB    -0.1249* -0.1707*** 
    (0.0670) (0.0379) 
      
1-year lag effect     0.3483 
     (0.5017) 
      
2-year lag effect     -0.2676 
     (0.4821) 
      
30 
 
Log fall Enrollment -0.9152 -0.9103 -0.9101 -0.9098 0.1204 
 (0.6511) (0.6514) (0.6513) (0.6516) (0.9371) 
      
% White enrollment 0.0382** 0.0383** 0.0383** 0.0383** 0.0333* 
 (0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0192) 
      
% Pell grant 0.0147 0.0148 0.0148 0.0147 0.0045 
 (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0169) 
      
Teacher median wage -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
      
State median wage -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002* 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
      
State unemployment rate -2.4077 -3.1657 -3.1900 -3.2316 -5.4729 
 (9.2250) (9.0924) (8.9985) (8.9677) (7.1957) 
      
Teacher evaluation -0.6930 -0.7319 -0.7333 -0.7340 -0.6993 
 (0.4649) (0.4740) (0.4678) (0.4707) (0.4590) 
      
Union membership density -0.0988 -0.1011 -0.1012 -0.1014 0.0097 
 (0.0671) (0.0687) (0.0692) (0.0692) (0.0843) 
      
School age population 22.9312*** 23.3259*** 23.3350*** 23.3393*** 21.4967*** 
 (8.5217) (8.4293) (8.4737) (8.4451) (6.0150) 
      
No prior accountability X 
time trend  -0.0472 0.7806 -0.0368 -0.1813 
  (0.0410) (27.3327) (0.1108) (0.2375) 
      
No prior accountability X 
time trend squared   -0.0002   
   (0.0068)   
      
Observations 11,512 11,512 11,512 11,512 8,614 
R-squared 0.0438 0.0439 0.0439 0.0439 0.0527 
Number of unitid 1,613 1,613 1,613 1,613 1,374 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is the percentage of all college students who major in education, 
including both part-time and full-time undergraduate students. 
 
In model 4, I examine whether NCLB has affected not only the level but also the trend in 
teacher supply, i.e., the slope. I create a new variable, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝐶𝐿𝐵𝑡, which represents the 
number of years since the NCLB was implemented. This variable is defined as year – 2002, with 
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all years prior to NCLB are coded as zero. Then, I include this new variable, 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝐶𝐿𝐵𝑡, and its interaction term with No prior accountability in the regression 
model. The total effect of NCLB on teacher supply from this model is equal to the coefficient on 
the interaction terms between No prior accountability and NCLB + (the coefficient on the 
interaction terms between No prior accountability and 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝐶𝐿𝐵𝑡 * the number of 
years during which NCLB has been implemented). As of 2015, the effect of NCLB on teacher 
supply is – 0.25, which indicates that NCLB has decreased enrollment in education majors by 
0.25 percentage points as of 2015. This effect, however, cannot be distinguished from zero. 
In model 5, I examine whether there were delayed effects of NCLB on teacher supply. I 
include two variables in the DID model that capture the 1-year and 2-year lag effects of NCLB.10 
Results from these models suggest that there are no immediate or delayed effects of NCLB on 
enrollment in education programs. Overall, regression estimates from table 2 suggest that, 
regardless of model specification, the accountability requirements of NCLB have had no 
significant impact on enrollment in education programs. 
In table 3, I examine the effect of NCLB on the percentage of undergraduate degrees 
awarded in education programs. Similar to table 2, I control for both institution-level and year 
fixed effects in all models. As shown in model 1, the coefficient on the interaction terms between 
NCLB and 𝑁𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 indicates that NCLB has increased education degrees by 
1.0 percentage points in states without prior accountability systems relative to other states. 
Accounting for group-specific time trends in models 2 and 3 slightly reduces the magnitude of 
the interaction terms but the effect is still positive and tentatively significant. For example, model 
                                                          
10 Data on enrollment in education programs are only available for three years prior to the introduction of NCLB in 
2002: 1996, 1998, and 2000. 
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2 shows that NCLB has increased education degrees by .0.8 percentage points in states without 
prior accountability systems relative to other states (p<0.1). 
In model 4, I explore the differential effect of NCLB on the trend in education degrees in 
states without prior accountability systems. Consistent with the models 1-3, NCLB seems to 
have an immediate positive effect on education degrees in states without prior accountability 
relative to other states. The coefficient on the interaction term between NCLB and no prior 
accountability suggests that NCLB has an immediate effect of 0.74 percentage points on 
education degrees (p<0.1). This effect, however, is only significant at the 0.1 level. It also 
declines by 0.23 percentage points for each year that followed the implementation of NCLB. As 
of 2015, the total effect of NCLB on education degrees is – 2.2, which indicates that NCLB has 
reduced education degrees by 2.2 percentage points in states without prior accountability systems 
relative to other states.  
In model 5, I examine whether there were any delayed effects of NCLB on degrees 
awarded in education programs. Estimates from this model suggest that each year that followed 
the implementation of NCLB has reduced education degrees in states without prior 
accountability systems by 0.26 percentage points relative to other states. There is no evidence, 
however, that NCLB has had any delayed effects on the percentage of degrees awarded in 
education programs. For example, the coefficients on the 2-year and 3-year lag variables are 
negative but cannot be distinguished from zero. 
There are two possible explanations for the immediate positive effects of NCLB on 
education degrees. The first is that NCLB required states to ensure that all students are taught by 
highly qualified teachers. NCLB defined highly qualified teachers as those who have a 
bachelor’s degree, state certification, and knowledge of the subject matter. These requirements 
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might have improved the job prospects of students in traditional education programs, and 
therefore, encouraged them to finish their education degrees. Second, during the early stages of 
its implementation, NCLB was perceived as an important positive step towards improving the 
performance of students. For instance, NCLB was passed overwhelmingly in the U.S. Congress, 
supported by both Democrats and Republicans. This early positive perception of NCLB may 
have encouraged students to complete their education degrees. However, as schools started to 
experience the negative consequences of the law, the perception of NCLB may have changed. 
Table 3: Effects of NCLB on Education Degrees 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES      
            
NCLB* No prior accountability 0.9600** 0.8381** 0.8700** 0.7407* 0.4252 
 (0.4330) (0.4035) (0.4102) (0.3901) (0.3075) 
      
No prior accountability * years 
under NCLB    -0.2279** -0.2647** 
    (0.1000) (0.1185) 
      
Years under NCLB    -0.3202*** -0.2845*** 
    (0.0639) (0.0684) 
      
1-year lag effect     0.3687 
     (0.2954) 
      
2-year lag effect     -0.0478 
     (0.2952) 
      
3-year lag effect     -0.0554 
     (0.2596) 
      
Log fall Enrollment -0.9932** -0.9922** -0.9819** -0.9803** -0.9358* 
 (0.4703) (0.4709) (0.4686) (0.4684) (0.4826) 
      
% White enrollment -0.0083 -0.0083 -0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0061 
 (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0079) 
      
% Pell grant 0.0241** 0.0241** 0.0238** 0.0237** 0.0199* 
 (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0118) 
      
Teacher median wage 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
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 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
      
State median wage -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0001** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
      
State unemployment rate 4.8082 4.8624 3.5027 3.3134 1.8711 
 (6.5754) (6.6081) (6.4081) (6.4195) (8.0863) 
      
Teacher evaluation -0.0513 -0.0458 -0.1357 -0.1377 -0.1962 
 (0.2966) (0.2943) (0.2948) (0.2937) (0.3103) 
      
Union membership density -0.0263 -0.0253 -0.0237 -0.0221 -0.0116 
 (0.0564) (0.0567) (0.0572) (0.0578) (0.0632) 
      
School age population 21.5902** 21.5678** 22.1242** 22.0063** 19.4332** 
 (9.0560) (9.0277) (8.8869) (8.8991) (7.7799) 
      
No prior accountability X time 
trend  0.0111 35.3191** 0.1211** 0.1495** 
  (0.0333) (16.1827) (0.0581) (0.0713) 
      
No prior accountability X time 
trend squared   -0.0088**   
   (0.0040)   
      
Observations 38,335 38,335 38,335 38,335 34,029 
R-squared 0.0598 0.0599 0.0608 0.0610 0.0575 
Number of unitid 2,706 2,706 2,706 2,706 2,627 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
2.5.2 Subgroup Analysis 
In this section, I examine whether the effects of NCLB vary by students’ demographic 
characteristics or the type of their education degrees. In all models, I include the same set of 
control variables used in the main analysis. However, I only report the coefficients for the key 
independent variables.  In table 4, I investigate the effects of NCLB on the supply decisions of 
minority students. Columns 1-3 present the results for enrollment in education majors whereas 
columns 4-6 show the effects for education degrees. Across all specifications, I find that NCLB 
has large negative effects on minority enrollment in education majors. For example, results from 
table 4 suggest that NCLB has reduced minority enrollment in education programs by 
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somewhere between 2.8 (model 1) and 4.0 percentage points (model 3). I also find some negative 
effects of NCLB on education degrees awarded to minority students. However, these effects 
cannot be distinguished from zero. 
One potential explanation for the large negative effects of NCLB on minority enrollment 
in education programs is that minority teachers tend to work in schools with large shares of 
disadvantaged students. These schools have experienced the most severe consequences of NCLB 
which might have discouraged minority candidates from choosing teaching as a career. In 
addition, the opportunity costs of becoming a teacher are higher for minority college students 
than other students. That is, because of the small share of minority students who attend college, 
minority college students may have better employment and career opportunities aside from 
teaching (Ingersoll et al., 2017). Therefore, by increasing the costs of becoming a teacher, NCLB 
has disproportionately affected enrollment of minority students. 
Table 4: Effects of NCLB on the Teacher Supply of Minority Students 
  Enrollment Education Degrees 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  
        
NCLB* No prior 
accountability -2.8159* -3.1055** -3.9827* -1.5294 -1.2247 -1.0377 
 (1.4039) (1.3850) (2.2938) (1.6604) (1.4508) (1.4501) 
       
No prior accountability * 
years under NCLB  0.0061 -0.2458  0.1367 0.2682 
  (0.1631) (0.6153)  (0.3571) (0.3455) 
       
years under NCLB  -1.1592*** -1.2700***  -0.1268 -0.1411 
  (0.2629) (0.2610)  (0.2429) (0.2475) 
       
1-year lag   0.9283*   0.6717 
   (0.5462)   (1.0881) 
       
2-year lag   -0.4167   -0.9908 
   (0.9828)   (1.0220) 
3-year lag      -0.5819 
      (1.3353) 
No prior accountability X 
time trend -0.0789 -0.0645 0.1615 0.0619 -0.0490 -0.0724 
 (0.0718) (0.1555) (0.6212) (0.1795) (0.2109) (0.2075) 
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Observations 10,445 10,445 7,603 29,817 29,817 29,740 
R-squared 0.4366 0.4358 0.4522 0.5133 0.5133 0.5145 
Number of unitid 1,609 1,609 1,373 2,547 2,547 2,523 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In table 5, I examine whether NCLB has affected degrees awarded in special education or 
math & science education. The first three models present the results from special education 
programs while the last three models provide the results for math & science programs. As shown 
in models 1-3, there is no effect of NCLB on degrees awarded in special education programs. 
Across all models, the coefficient on the interaction term between NCLB and No prior 
accountability is positive and cannot be distinguished from zero. 
Table 5: Effects of NCLB on Degrees Awarded in Special Education and Math & Science 
  Special Education Math & Science 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (7) (8) (9) 
              
NCLB 3.7746 3.2871 3.1188 -0.3639 -0.0794 -0.1048 
 (2.5601) (2.2644) (2.2723) (0.3183) (0.2432) (0.2566) 
       
NCLB* No prior 
accountability 0.7603 0.7929 0.4734 -0.0728 -0.0984 -0.3566 
 (0.5514) (0.5597) (0.4611) (0.3228) (0.3274) (0.2674) 
       
No prior accountability * 
years under NCLB  0.0858 0.0650  -0.0681 -0.1029* 
  (0.2369) (0.2052)  (0.0460) (0.0563) 
       
years under NCLB  -0.1624 -0.2329*  0.0933** 0.0875** 
  (0.1281) (0.1355)  (0.0402) (0.0332) 
       
1-year lag   0.0923   0.0197 
   (0.3244)   (0.2925) 
       
2-year lag   0.0861   0.4311 
   (0.4941)   (0.3497) 
       
3-year lag   -0.5404   -0.1846 
   (0.4879)   (0.1819) 
No prior accountability X 
time trend -0.0182 -0.0590 0.0206 -0.0135 0.0188 0.0420 
 (0.0706) (0.1162) (0.1185) (0.0221) (0.0278) (0.0425) 
       
Observations 36,782 36,782 32,496 36,782 36,782 32,496 
R-squared 0.0049 0.0049 0.0036 0.0031 0.0033 0.0031 
Number of unitid 2,627 2,627 2,541 2,627 2,627 2,541 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Estimates from models 4-6 show some negative effects of NCLB on degrees awarded in 
math and science education programs. For example, the coefficient on the interaction terms 
between No prior accountability and Years under NCLB in model 6 indicates that each year 
under NCLB has reduced degrees awarded in math and science education programs by 0.10 
percentage points in states without prior accountability systems relative to other states. This 
effects, however, are only significant at the 0.1 level. 
2.6 Robustness Checks 
In this section, I test the sensitivity of the results to different sample restrictions and 
alternative specifications. Up to this point, I measured school accountability using a binary 
variable, No prior accountability, which distinguishes between states with and without 
accountability systems prior to NCLB. There are two main limitations of this binary variable. 
First, it doesn’t take into account the number of years during which a state accountability system 
has been in place before the NCLB. That is, the binary treatment variable doesn’t distinguish 
between states that implemented accountability systems shortly before NCLB and other states 
that had adopted these systems for many years before the law was passed. In fact, as discussed in 
Dee at al. (2013), more than half of the states with prior accountability systems have adopted 
these systems 4 years or fewer prior to the NCLB. 
Failing to distinguish between states with prior accountability systems based on the 
length of these systems may attenuate the estimated effect of the NCLB. To address this 
limitation, I define the treatment variable as the number of years, prior to the NCLB, that a state 
didn’t implement school accountability. Following Dee and Jacob (2011) and Dee et al. (2013), I 
define the treatment variable as the number of years between the 1991-92 academic year and the 
introduction of the NCLB in 2002-03 that a state didn’t implement an accountability system. The 
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regression estimates from this specification are presented in Panel A of table 6. I find no 
significant effects of NCLB on either enrollment in education majors or education degrees. 
Table 6: Robustness Checks 
  Enrollment Education Degrees 
A. Prior accountability defined in years     
NCLB* No prior accountability -0.0708 -0.1046 
 (0.0952) (0.1080) 
   
Observations 11,572 38,397 
   
B. States with strong school accountability   
NCLB* No prior accountability 0.5258 0.3648 
 (0.9899) (0.3672) 
   
Observations 11,572 38,397 
   
C. States that rely heavily on traditional programs    
NCLB* No prior accountability -0.3000 0.4727 
 (0.9002) (0.4324) 
   
Observations 7,325 24,171 
Note: All models are estimated using panel data fixed effects and include institution-level and 
state-level control variables in addition to linear time trend. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The second limitation of the binary treatment variable is that it ignores the variation in 
school accountability systems across states prior to NCLB, especially in terms of the strength of 
these systems (Lee and Wong 2004). States with weak accountability systems may not represent 
a good “counterfactual” for states without prior accountability systems and, as a result, the effect 
of the NCLB may be underestimated. To account for that possibility, I redefine the treatment 
variable to include only states without strong prior accountability systems. That is, the treatment 
variable takes 1 for states without strong accountability systems prior to NCLB and zero 
otherwise. Regression estimates from this specification are shown in panel B of table 6. Similar 
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to the results from panel A, there is no evidence that NCLB has significantly affected teacher 
supply. 
Another limitation of the main analysis is that the dataset doesn’t include information on 
enrollment in alternative certification programs. As shown in figure A1 in the appendix, 
enrollment in these programs has increased substantially over the last two decades. Between 
2000 and 2015, the percentage of individuals who completed alternative programs increased 
from 6 percent to 15 percent (U.S. Department of Education 2016). There is, however, a large 
variation in enrollment in these programs across states (see table A2 in the appendix). While 
some states still rely heavily on traditional programs to train potential teachers, others have 
adopted alternative certification programs to address teacher shortages and attract talented 
individuals to teaching. Because of this large cross-state variation, the effect of the NCLB may 
vary across states based on its reliance on traditional teacher preparation programs. I test this 
assumption using data from the U.S. Department of Education on enrollment in both traditional 
and alternative programs in 2012. I use this state-level data to identify states that rely heavily on 
traditional programs to train teachers, i.e., states where enrollment in traditional programs 
represents at least 90 percent of total enrollment in education programs. I, then, estimate the 
effect of the NCLB on this group of states, excluding all other states where enrollment in 
traditional programs represents less than 90 percent of total enrollment in teacher preparation 
programs. Panel C reports the results from this specification. Consistent with the results from 
panels A and B, I find no effect of the NCLB on enrollment in education majors or degrees 
awarded in education. Overall, the results from table 6 suggest that NCLB has no effect on 
teacher supply. Although the main analysis shows some immediate positive impact of NCLB on 
education degrees, this finding appears to be sensitive to the model specification. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
In this paper, I examine the effect of the NCLB on teacher supply. Following previous 
research, I take advantage of the fact that several states had adopted consequential school 
accountability systems prior to the introduction of NCLB. To estimate the effect of NCLB, I use 
a DID approach in which I compare both enrollment and degrees awarded in education programs 
in states with and without prior accountability systems, before and after the introduction of the 
NCLB. 
The analysis is based on two key identification assumptions. First, the DID design 
assumes that changes in teacher supply in states with prior accountability systems and those 
without prior accountability systems follow the same trend, i.e., the parallel trend assumption. 
The second identification assumption is that school accountability systems that were in place 
before the NCLB are similar to the accountability requirements imposed by the NCLB. I test the 
sensitivity of the results to these two assumptions using several robustness checks. First, to test 
the parallel trend assumption, I compare the trend in enrollment and degrees awarded in 
education majors degrees before the introduction of the NCLB among states with and without 
prior accountability systems. Further, I allow for the slope of teacher supply and its time trend to 
vary across states in both groups. Particularly, I employ a CITS design that allows for a 
differential shift not only in the level of teacher supply (the intercept), but also a shift in the trend 
in this supply after the introduction of the NCLB (the slope) and the time trend for states with 
and without prior accountability systems. 
To test the plausibility of the second identification assumption, I conduct several 
robustness checks. First, since some of the states with prior accountability systems have adopted 
these systems immediately prior to the NCLB, I define the treatment variable as the number of 
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years without prior accountability. Second, I restrict the sample to states with strong 
accountability systems and exclude any state that implemented weak or moderate accountability 
systems. The reason is that states with weak or moderate accountability systems will not 
represent a good counterfactual for states without prior accountability. Third, I restrict the 
sample to states that rely heavily on traditional teacher preparation programs and exclude any 
state in which alternative programs comprise a large share of enrollment in teaching programs 
(more than 10 percent). 
Across all specifications, I find no differences in the effect of the NCLB in states with 
and without prior accountability systems on either enrollment or degrees awarded in education 
programs. However, I find some evidence that the introduction of the NCLB has significantly 
reduced percentage of minority students enrolled in education programs. 
The findings have important policy implications. The evidence presented in this study 
provides some support for the popular belief that NCLB has discouraged individuals from 
pursuing teaching as a career. I find that, NCLB has reduced the percentage of minority students 
enrolled in education majors by more than 3 percentage points. The large negative effect of 
NCLB on the teacher supply of minority students suggests that the consequences of school 
accountability systems may extend beyond the direct impact on student achievement or teacher 
mobility and retention. These systems may increase the cost of becoming a teacher, especially 
with respect to the non-pecuniary aspects of the teaching profession such as job autonomy and 
satisfaction. By putting more pressure on teachers to improve student performance, school 
accountability systems may increase the level of stress and anxiety among existing teachers and 
undermine the perception of teaching as a stable career among potential teachers. Therefore, 
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policymakers should take into account the potential adverse effects on teacher supply when 
designing school accountability systems. 
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Chapter III: Teacher Prep Performance Assessment and Retention in Education Majors 
3.1 Introduction 
Over the last few years, teacher preparation programs in the U.S. have attracted 
increasing attention from educators, policymakers and academics. Concern is growing that 
prospective teachers graduate from these programs without acquiring adequate training to 
succeed in the classroom (Boyd et al. 2007, U.S. Department of Education 2011, Goldhaber, 
Cowan, and Theobald 2016). Both the federal and state governments have introduced plans to 
improve the quality of teacher preparation programs. In 2016, for instance, the U.S. Department 
of Education implemented new regulations that require states to report basic annual information 
on teacher preparation programs, such as employment outcomes of graduates of each program 
and whether these graduates demonstrated success in improving student learning. The purpose of 
this information is to improve the transparency of teacher preparation programs and to help 
teacher candidates make informed decisions about whether they should enroll in a particular 
program. 
Several states have implemented reforms that seek to improve the effectiveness of 
preparation programs. In 2014, for example, Georgia required all teacher candidates, including 
those enrolled in alternative certification programs, to pass a teacher performance assessment 
exam called edTPA in order to be certified by the state. The purpose of the edTPA exam is to 
ensure that only qualified candidates enter teaching. By 2018, 18 states have adopted the edTPA 
performance assessment and an additional 19 states have at least one teacher preparation 
program that is exploring the implementation of edTPA.11 Despite the rapid adoption of the 
                                                          
11 Table A3 in the appendix provides a list of states that have adopted the edTPA performance assessment. 
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edTPA, we know little about its effects on retention in teacher preparation programs and teacher 
quality in general. 
Proponents of teacher performance assessment argue that the edTPA assessment will 
improve the quality of teachers through four main channels (Boyd et al. 2007, Goldhaber, 
Cowan, and Theobald 2016). First, it will improve teacher education programs. Teacher 
preparation programs will use the edTPA assessment as an educational tool to enhance the 
performance of teacher candidates. For example, the edTPA assessment will help preparation 
programs identify whether their teaching practices or curriculum are effective at preparing 
candidates to succeed in the classroom. It may also enable these programs to identify the type of 
skills that are necessary for teacher candidates to pass the edTPA exam. Second, by setting high 
standards for entering the teaching profession, edTPA assessment may encourage teacher 
candidates to improve their knowledge and teaching practices. Third, teacher performance 
assessment will serve as a “screening tool” that keeps less qualified teacher candidates out of the 
teaching profession. For example, candidates who fail to pass the edTPA exam will not be able 
to apply for teacher certification. Fourth, teacher performance assessment will help school 
educators identify high quality candidates based on their performance on the edTPA exam, i.e., 
signaling effect. In other words, school educators may use performance of teacher candidates on 
the edTPA exam as a signal of their potential job performance which may make them more 
reluctant to hire candidates with low edTPA scores.  
However, the edTPA increases the costs of becoming a teacher in both time and effort12, 
which may deter qualified candidates from choosing teaching as a career (Boyd et al. 2007). If 
                                                          
12 Anecdotal evidence suggest that it takes teacher candidates several months to prepare their portfolios for the 
edTPA exam (Jette 2014). 
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edTPA exam scores are only weakly related to performance in the classroom, then requiring it 
will have limited or even negative effects on student outcomes.  
This essay examines whether the introduction of pre-service performance requirements in 
Georgia has affected college outcomes of students in education programs relative to students in 
other programs. Thus, this essay seeks to answer the following research questions: 
• Did the introduction of teacher performance assessment affect student retention in 
education programs? 
• Did the new performance requirement affect students’ choice of college major? 
• Does the effect of teacher performance assessment vary by student demographic 
characteristics or high school performance? 
To answer these questions, I use administrative data on postsecondary students from the 
University System of Georgia (USG). The data includes basic information on student socio-
economic and demographic characteristics, such as gender, race, and age, in addition to 
information on Pell grant eligibility, amount of financial aid received, and high school 
performance. The USG data, however, doesn’t include information on whether students have 
taken the new performance assessment exam. Therefore, I estimate the effects of the new 
performance requirements by examining the change over time in college outcomes of students 
with an education major before and after the implementation of performance assessment in fall 
2015, relative to other students. 
This chapter doesn’t seek to estimate the effect of taking the edTPA test on students’ 
outcomes. Rather, it examines whether requiring all teacher candidates to pass the new edTPA 
performance assessment has any impact on their college outcomes relative to other students, 
regardless of whether or not they have taken the test. For example, the mere 
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knowledge/awareness of the new edTPA requirements may discourage some students from 
persisting in college or cause them to choose to switch their major. 
This paper is one of the first to examine the supply side effects of the edTPA 
performance assessment, though Goldhaber et al. (2016) has examined the effects of edTPA on 
teacher quality in Washington State. Understanding the supply side effects of the edTPA 
performance assessment is important since these effects represent one of the key mechanisms 
through which the edTPA assessment is expected to improve teacher quality. The direction of 
this effect, however, is ambiguous. On the one hand, requiring all teacher candidates to pass the 
edTPA exam may improve the quality of teacher candidates and ensure that poorly prepared 
candidates don’t enter the teaching profession. On the other hand, imposing the new edTPA 
requirements on teacher candidates may discourage some qualified teacher candidates, especially 
those with high opportunity costs, from pursuing teaching as a career. As some of the evidence 
on the licensure requirements suggests (see for example, Gitomer et al. 1999), the edTPA 
assessment may also disproportionally affect the chances of minority candidates to become 
teachers which will have long-term implications for the diversity of the teaching workforce. 
The results from this paper suggest that teacher prep performance assessment has no 
impact on students’ persistence into their senior year of college, attrition from education majors, 
or the likelihood of graduating within four years. These results are robust to multiple sample 
restrictions and alternative specifications. 
3.2 Pre-service Performance Assessment 
Most states require teacher candidates to pass licensure tests that cover basic skills, 
general knowledge, content knowledge, and pedagogic skills (Boyd et al. 2007).13 The edTPA 
                                                          
13 Most states requiring exams use the Praxis exam administered by Educational Testing Services (ETS). 
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exam differs from traditional question-and-answer licensure exams in that it focuses on the 
classroom practices and pedagogical strategies is a specific subject- (Goldhaber, Cowan, and 
Theobald 2016).14 This exam was developed by researchers at Stanford University’s Center for 
Assessment, Learning, and Equity (SCALE) in 2009 and was launched operationally in 2013. 
Since 2013, the edTPA exam has been adopted by more than 700 teacher preparation programs 
in 38 states and the District of Columbia (edTPA 2015). On April 2014, the Georgia Professional 
Standards Commissions (GaPSC) announced that all teacher candidates who completed student 
teaching in fall 2015 or later would be required to pass the edTPA performance assessment to 
receive certification.15 
Teacher candidates are required to take the edTPA exam at the end of their preparation 
programs, i.e., after finishing the coursework and during their field placements. Teacher 
candidates must pay a $300 fee to create a portfolio of materials that includes lesson plans, 
instructional materials, samples of student work, and feedback on student work. Candidates also 
submit unedited video recordings of instruction in a real classroom as part of their portfolios. 
Then, current teachers and educators score these materials. The evaluation process focuses on 
three main tasks: Planning, Instruction, and Assessment. Each task contains 5 different rubrics, 
each of which is scored on a 1-5 scale. Examples of rubrics in the Planning task includes 
“Planning for Content Understanding,” “Planning to Support Varied Student Needs,” and 
                                                          
14 The edTPA assessment is similar to the certification process required by the National Board for Professional 
Teaching Standards (NBPTS). However, unlike the edTPA performance assessment which targets teacher 
candidates who still attending teacher preparation programs, the NBPTS only provides certification for current 
teachers with a valid state license and three years of experience prior to the certification process. 
15 In addition to the edTPA assessment, GaPSC required teacher preparation programs to apply for a Pre-service 
Certificate for all teacher candidates who complete any field experiences or student teaching in Georgia schools 
after July 1, 2015. Under the new GaPSC rules, teacher candidates are also required to pass an ethics exam upon 
entering their preparation programs and prior to graduation. It should be noted that teacher candidates are still 
required to pass the traditional state licensure exam, the Georgia Assessments for the Certification of Educators 
(GACE.) 
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“Identifying and Supporting Language Demands.” States set different standards as to what 
constitutes a passing score (edTPA 2015). In Georgia, the passing is 38, which is below the 
national average of 42. Georgia also allows teacher candidates to take the edTPA exam more 
than once. 
3.3 Literature Review 
This paper contributes to the research on teacher supply. Most of the current literature 
focuses on whether teacher preparation programs affect, and performance on licensure tests 
predict, teacher performance in the classroom, measured using teacher value-added models. The 
evidence is mixed. I begin this section by reviewing the research on teacher supply in general 
and then discuss the current evidence on teacher preparation programs and certification 
requirements. 
3.3.1 Teacher Supply 
Previous research considering teacher entry has largely focused on gender, cognitive 
ability, salaries, and the quality of the working conditions in schools (Dolton 2006, Guarino, 
Santibañez, and Daley 2006). Women are more likely to enter the teaching profession than men 
(e.g., Henke at al. (2000)), but as college-going among women has sharply increased (Goldin, 
Katz, and Kuziemko 2006), the proportion of women choosing teaching has declined 
substantially. In 1960, for example, about 50 percent of women who graduated from college 
entered teaching, compared to less than 10 percent in 1990 (Flyer and Rosen 1997). 
As women increasingly became able to enter highly-paid professions, high-ability college 
graduates are less likely than low-ability graduates to choose teaching as a profession (ACT 
2015, Corcoran, Evans, and Schwab 2004b, a, Guarino, Santibañez, and Daley 2006, Podgursky, 
Monroe, and Watson 2004a). Podgursky et al. (2004a) found that individuals who choose 
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teaching as a career have significantly lower ACT scores that those who choose other 
occupations. They also find that, among individuals with high ACT scores, women are less likely 
to enter the teaching profession than their male counterparts. Henke et al. (2000) found that 
college graduates who scored in the top quartile of college entrance exams are less likely to enter 
teaching than those who scored in the bottom quartile. Several other studies have reached similar 
conclusions (Ballou, Springer, and Urban 2009, Gitomer, Latham, and Ziomek 1999). 
Teachers’ salaries are a key determinant of individuals’ decisions to enter the teaching 
profession. Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 
(NLS-72), Manski (1987) found that the wage elasticity of teacher supply ranges between 2.4 
and 3.2. His findings indicate that a 10 percent increase in teachers’ wages will raise the supply 
of teachers among college graduates by 5 percentage points, from 19 to 24 percent of all college 
graduates. However, other studies have shown that the relative levels of teachers’ wages, i.e., 
teachers’ wages relative to other occupations, are more important than the absolute levels in 
predicting entry into teaching. Dolton (1990), for example, used data on a cohort of college 
students from the UK to examine the factors that affect their occupational choices. He found that 
both relative wages and wage growth in teaching affected individuals’ decisions to choose 
teaching as a career (see also (Zabalza 1979a, b)). Similar evidence is provided by Rickman, 
Wang and Winters (2015), who found that the share of education majors who became public 
school teachers was higher in states with higher relative salaries. Other studies have also shown 
that labor market conditions generally, such as the comparative levels of unemployment and 
levels of pay, may also influence individuals’ decisions of whether to become teachers (Blom, 
Cadena, and Keys 2015, Dolton, Tremayne, and Chung 2003). Blom et al. (2015), for instance, 
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found that, during periods of poor economic conditions, students are less likely to choose low-
paying college majors or majors with high unemployment rates. 
The attractiveness of jobs in teaching in comparison to alternative occupations also seems 
to matter. For instance, Corcoran, Evans and Schwab (2004b, 2004a) found that between 1957 
and 1992, women at the top of their high school class became increasingly unlikely to choose 
teaching as a profession, finding a decline from 20 percent in 1964 to under 4 percent in 1992. 
This sharp decline may be attributed to the remarkable increases in the opportunities available to 
women. 
Working conditions, such as the physical attributes of schools, teachers’ workload, and 
the quality and socio-economic characteristics of students also affect teacher labor market 
outcomes (Johnson 2006, Johnson, Berg, and Donaldson 2005, Ladd 2011, Loeb, Darling-
Hammond, and Luczak 2005). Ladd (2011) found that teachers’ perceptions of their working 
conditions increase their intentions to leave their current schools and account for 15 percent of 
the variation across schools in actual departure rates. 
3.3.2 Certification Requirements and Teacher Preparation Programs 
A large body of research on the relationship between certification requirements and 
teacher outcomes has focused on the effect of certification requirements on teacher quality. 
Goldhaber and Brewer (2000), for example, found that cross-state differences in teacher 
licensure requirements, such as whether a state requires any type of teacher exam or requires 
field experience prior to student teaching, have no effects on student achievement. Goldhaber 
(2007) found some evidence that some teacher licensure tests in North Carolina improve student 
achievement, but these effects are generally small. 
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Clotfelter et al. (2007) found that teacher certification requirements have a large positive 
effect on student math achievement but modest effect on reading achievement. Larsen (2015) 
uses variation in teacher licensing requirements across states between 1983 and 2008 to find that 
requiring a certification test for initial licensures may discourage first-year teachers with high 
ability, measured using their SAT scores, from staying in the profession. Among teachers who 
remain in the profession, however, Larsen found that requiring a licensing test is associated with 
an increase in “input quality,” measured using the average SAT scores of entering students at the 
undergraduate institution that a teacher attended. 
Using data from North Carolina, Goldhaber & Anthony (2007) examined the effect of 
certification of teachers by the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS) on 
teacher performance. In general, their results suggest that NBPTS-certified teachers tend to be 
more effective than both teachers who applied but failed to obtain the NBPTS certification and 
teachers who never applied for the program. The effect of the NBPTS certification, however, 
varies significantly across grades and student subgroups. Using data from Washington State, 
Goldhaber et al. (2016) found that edTPA scores have positive impacts on student achievement 
in math in some specifications but not on reading. However, when measuring edTPA assessment 
using a pass/fail binary indicator, they found that passing the edTPA exam improves student 
achievement in reading but has no effect on student performance in math. 
Teacher preparation programs have attracted growing scholarly interest, but the evidence 
is inconclusive. Some studies have reported large differences in teacher quality across teacher 
preparation programs. For example, using data on public school teachers in New York City, 
Boyd el al. (2009) found large variation across both traditional and alternative preparation 
programs in the quality of teachers they produce. Their results also suggest that teacher 
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preparation programs that produce effective math teachers also tend to produce effective 
language arts teachers. Several other studies, however, found no differences in teacher quality 
across preparation programs. Noell et al. (2007) and Gansle et al. (2012) examined variation in 
teacher quality among recent graduates of teacher preparation programs in Louisiana. Their 
findings showed few significant differences in teacher performance among individuals 
graduating from different preparation programs. Using data from Washington State, Goldhaber 
et al. (2013) found little difference in teacher quality between teachers who graduated from state-
accredited programs and those who graduated from programs outside the state. Hippel et al. 
(2016) also found small differences in teacher quality among teachers graduated from different 
preparation programs in Texas. 
The mixed evidence on the effectiveness of teacher preparation programs might be driven 
by differences in identification strategy across studies. Mihaly et al. (2012), for instance, found 
that the effects of teacher preparation programs in Florida are sensitive to including school fixed 
effects. Their findings also suggest that including school fixed effects results in less precise 
preparation program estimates. Koedel et al. (2015) argue that most of the prior research treats 
students taught by the same teacher as independent observations and therefore tends to 
overestimate differences in teacher quality across programs. To address this issue, Koedel et al. 
(2015) clustered the standard error at the teacher level and found that most of the variation in 
teacher quality differences across teacher preparation programs can be attributed to estimation-
error variance. 
Only a handful of studies have examined whether changes in the requirements for teacher 
preparation programs affect individuals’ decisions to enter the teaching profession. Hanushek 
and Pace (1995) found that individuals are less likely to complete their teacher preparation 
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programs in states that require potential teachers to complete specific courses and tests, impose a 
pre-specified cut-off on a standardized test or ask their trainee teachers to complete a significant 
number of education-related courses. Thus, more lenient certification requirements may increase 
the supply of teachers (Boyd et al. 2007). Angrist and Guryan (2004) found that teacher testing 
requirements have no effect on the type or affiliation of education programs that teacher 
candidates attended. For example, their results show no effect of state testing on the quality of 
new teachers or their likelihood of attending traditional teacher preparation programs. Gitomer et 
al. (1999) examined the heterogeneous effects of teacher testing using data on more than 300,000 
teacher candidates who took the Praxis exams for admission into college or as part of their 
licensure requirements between 1994 and 1997.16 They found substantial differences in Praxis 
passing rates between white and minority teacher candidates. For example, among individuals 
who took the SAT exam, 82 percent of white candidates passed the Praxis I exam compared to 
46 percent of African American candidates. The results also suggest that while raising the 
passing scores on the Praxis exam will increase the average ability of teacher candidates, 
measured using their SAT and ACT scores; it will reduce the diversity of the teaching pool 
dramatically. 
3.4 Data and Methods 
To estimate the effects of pre-service performance assessment on students’ college 
outcomes, I use administrative data from the University System of Georgia (USG). The USG 
data includes information on students who started their postsecondary education in Georgia 
between academic years 2008-09 and 2016-17. 
                                                          
16 Several states require teacher candidates’ to pass the Praxis exams in order to be certified. These exams are used 
to assess candidates’ skills and knowledge of the subject matter. 
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Treatment status. The treatment group consists of students with education majors. To 
identify treatment status, I create a binary variable, education major, that takes one for students 
who declared their education as a major during the first year of their postsecondary education 
and zero otherwise. The comparison group is composed of all students who did not declare 
education as their major during their first year. One major limitation of this variable is that it 
doesn’t take into account that students may change their majors during the course of their 
postsecondary education. Therefore, to address this limitation, I test the sensitivity of the results 
to excluding students who changed their majors during their postsecondary studies. The results 
from this specification are discussed in the sensitivity analysis section. In general, the findings 
from this specification are very similar to baseline results discussed in section 5. 
I also create a binary variable, performance assessment, to capture the effect of teacher 
performance assessment on students’ college outcomes. This variable takes a value of 1 for 
students who were enrolled in college at the time of implementing the new performance 
requirements in fall 2015 and zero otherwise. On April 2014, the Georgia Professional Standards 
Commissions (GaPSC) announced that all teacher candidates in the state of Georgia would be 
required to pass the edTPA performance assessment to receive certification. These new 
performance assessment requirements affected all students who attended education programs in 
fall 2015 or later, including students in the first, second, third, or last year of their postsecondary 
education. 
The interaction term between education major and performance assessment represents 
the effect of performance assessment on college outcomes of students with education majors 
relative to other students. 
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College outcomes. I examine the effect of teacher prep performance assessment on three 
college outcomes: persistence in college, change of college major, and graduation within 4 years. 
First, I examine whether pre-service performance assessment has reduced college persistence 
among students in education programs. I measure persistence in college using a binary variable 
that takes one if students persist into their senior year of college and zero otherwise. Second, I 
examine whether teacher prep performance assessment has led students in education programs to 
change their college major. To measure change of college major, I create a binary variable that 
takes one for students who changed their college major between their first and senior years of 
college and zero otherwise. In addition to college persistence and choice of college major, I also 
examine the effect of performance assessment on 4-year degree attainment. This outcome is 
measured using a binary variable that indicates whether a student graduated from college within 
four years. 
Panel A in table 7 shows the treatment and control groups for the pre- and post-periods 
for the first two outcomes: persistence into senior year and change of college major. As shown, 
the treatment in the post-period includes students with education majors who started their 
postsecondary education in school year 2013-14. These students were in their third year at the 
time of implementing the new performance requirements. I examine whether performance 
assessment affected the decisions of these students to persist into their senior year or change their 
education major. The control group for the post-period includes students with non-education 
majors who were also in their third year in fall 2015. The pre-treatment period includes students 
who were first enrolled in college in school year 2012-13 or prior to that. Students who started 
their postsecondary education between schools 2014-15 and 2016-17 are excluded from the 
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sample since persistence into senior year and change of college major between first and senior 
years of college cannot be observed for this group of students. 
Table 7: Treatment and Control Groups for College Outcomes 
  Treatment Control 
 Pre Post Pre Post 
(A) College 
persistence/Change 
of major 
Students with 
education majors 
who were first 
enrolled in 2012-
13 or before 
Students with 
education majors 
who were first 
enrolled in 2013-
14 
Students with 
non-education 
majors who were 
first enrolled in 
2012-13 or 
before 
Students with 
non-education 
majors who 
first enrolled in 
2013-14 
(B) Graduation 
within 4 years 
Students with 
education majors 
who started their 
college between 
2009-08 and 2011-
12  
Students with 
education majors 
who started their 
college between 
school years 
2012-13 and 
2013-14.  
Students with 
non-education 
majors who 
started their 
college between 
2009-08 and 
2011-12 
Students with 
non-education 
majors who 
started their 
college 
between school 
years 2012-13 
and 2013-14.  
 
Panel B shows the treatment and control groups for the third outcome: graduation within 
4 years. As shown, the treatment group for the post-period includes students with education 
major who were in their third and fourth year at the time of implementing performance 
assessment, i.e., students who first enrolled in college in school years 2012-13 and 2013-14. 
These students will be affected by the new requirement since they will not be able to graduate 
without passing the edTPA exam. Data on 4-year degree attainment is not available for students 
who started their postsecondary education in fall 2014 or later. Therefore, I exclude these 
students from the sample. It should be noted that students who first enrolled in school year 2012-
13, i.e., those who were in their fourth year at the time of implementing performance assessment, 
are considered part of the post-period treatment group for the third outcome, graduation within 4 
years, but not the first two outcomes, college persistence and change of college major. The 
reason is that, unlike graduating from college, the decisions of this group of students to enroll in 
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their fourth year or to change their major in their fourth year are likely to happen at the beginning 
of school year 2015-16 before taking the assessment test and therefore these two outcomes are 
less likely to be affected by the introduction of performance assessment in September 2015. 
Nevertheless, as a robustness check, I exclude this cohort of students from the analysis. The 
estimates from this regression are reported in table A4 in the main appendix. As shown, the 
findings are very similar to the baseline results in section 5. 
Control variables. To account for differences between students with education majors and 
other students that may affect their college outcomes, I use information on students’ 
demographic characteristics, residency status, high school achievement, performance on SAT 
exam, and financial aid eligibility. 
Table 8 shows descriptive statistics of the sample. The sample includes students who 
started their college between school years 2008-09 and 2013-14 and attended 4-year programs. 
As shown, 45 percent of students in the sample are minority and 55 percent are females. The vast 
majority of students attending postsecondary education in the sample are in-state residents (91 
percent). The average high school GPA is 3.3. About 38 percent of students in the sample 
receive Pell grant in their first year. About 69 percent of students have persisted into their senior 
year of college. However, only 22 percent of individuals have completed their college degree 
within four years. 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Minority 45.1 - 
female 55.3 - 
In-state resident 91.3 - 
High school performance 
  
High school GPA 3.3 0.5 
SAT math 548.7 100.0 
SAT verbal 543.4 90.3 
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Financial aid 
  
Receive Pell grant (1st year) 38.4 - 
Total aid (1st year) 30.6 31.3 
College Outcomes 
  
Persistence to senior year 68.1 - 
Change college major 49.1 - 
Degree completion with 4 years 21.8 - 
Sample size 184,812   
 
Table 9 provides mean characteristics of the treatment and control groups before and 
after the implementation of teacher performance assessment. Overall, the average student 
enrolled in education programs is more likely to be female, white, and in-state resident. Students 
with education majors tend to have high school GPA that is similar to other students but they 
score lower on the SAT exam. Table 8 also shows that students in education programs are less 
likely to change their college major after the first year and more likely to graduate from college 
within 4 years. 
Table 9: Mean Characteristics of the Treatment and Control Groups 
  Education Major Non-Education Major  
Variable Pre Post Pre  Post  
Minority 34.97 37.17 45.55 46.49 *** 
 (47.69) (48.34) (49.80) (49.88)  
      
Female 78.39 80.01 53.54 54.62 *** 
 (41.16) (40.00) (49.87) (49.79)  
      
In-state resident 96.42 95.49 91.08 90.65 *** 
 (18.52) (20.66) (28.46) (29.08)  
High school performance      
High school GPA 3.21 3.28 3.27 3.33 *** 
 (0.50) (0.49) (0.53) (0.52)  
      
SAT math 516.04 507.51 550.53 551.71 *** 
 (80.70) (85.91) (99.96) (103.80)  
      
SAT verbal 520.57 517.50 544.21 547.69 *** 
 (78.64) (84.22) (90.13) (93.78)  
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Financial aid 
     
Receive Pell grant (1st year) 38.27 45.21 37.87 40.85 *** 
 (48.61) (49.79) (48.51) (49.16)  
      
Total first-year aid (in hundreds) 29.41 34.45 30.13 33.29 ** 
 (28.09) (30.09) (31.17) (33.02)  
College Outcomes      
Persistence to senior year 70.09 64.38 69.19 62.76 *** 
 (45.79) (47.90) (46.17) (48.35)  
      
Change college major 41.97 38.42 49.39 50.79 *** 
 (49.35) (48.66) (50.00) (49.99)  
      
Degree completion with 4 years 26.22 29.27 21.04 23.30 *** 
 (43.98) (45.51) (40.76) (42.27)  
      
Sample size 9,791 1,606 143,280 30,135  
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate whether differences between 
students with education majors and other students are statistically significant at the conventional 
levels. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Figure 5 compares the changes in the share of first-year students who were enrolled in 
education major to the share of students enrolled in other majors between 2008 and 2016. 
Overall, shares of enrollment in Business, Health Professions, and Science majors have shown 
substantial increases over time. For example, between 2008 and 2016, the share of enrollment in 
Business, Management, and Marketing major increased by 6.1 percentage points, from 8.4 
percent to 14.5 percent, compared to 6.3 percentage points for Health Professions major, and 6.7 
percentage points for Science majors. Enrollment in education major, however, has declined 
during the same period from 6.4 percent to 4.4 percent. Several factors might be responsible for 
this decline, such as cuts in school budgets during the recession, rise of school accountability, or 
any other changes in state and federal education policies. However, the empirical evidence on 
these factors is limited. 
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Figure 5: Shares of Enrollment in College Majors (2008-2016) 
To examine the effect of pre-service performance assessment on students’ college 
outcomes. I use a Difference-in-Differences (DID) model. I compare college outcomes of 
students with education major to the same outcomes for students with other majors, before and 
after the introduction of performance assessment in fall 2015. The DID model is specified as 
follows. 
𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖 +  𝛽2 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽3 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖 +  𝛽4 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑐
+  𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 is a binary variable that takes 1 for students with education major and 
zero otherwise; 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 is also a binary variable that takes 1 for students 
attending college at the time of the implementation of performance assessment in fall 2015; the 
interaction term between E𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 and performance assessment represents the effect of 
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performance assessment on college outcomes of students with education majors relative to other 
students; 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a vector of student-level characteristics such as demographic characteristics, 
high school GPA, and financial aid eligibility; 𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑐, and 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 represent cohort and 
institution fixed effects, respectively; and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an error term. All standard errors are clustered at 
the institution level. 
3.5 Results 
Teacher performance assessment may affect the decisions of students in education 
programs in three ways. First, edTPA performance assessment may discourage some individuals 
from choosing education as a major or lead them to change their education major. Second, 
edTPA may cause students to stay longer in college to prepare for the test, which may also delay 
their degree completion. Third, by increasing the barriers to becoming a teacher, edTPA may 
discourage some students in education programs from persisting in college. I explore these 
potential effects in tables 10-12. Table 10 presents the effects of teacher performance assessment 
on persistence into senior year of college, whereas tables 11 and 12 show the effects for change 
of college major between the first and senior years and degree completion within 4 years, 
respectively. 
3.5.1 Persistence in College 
Table 10 presents the effect of teacher performance assessment on students’ college 
persistence, measured using a binary variable that indicates whether a student persists to his/her 
senior year of college. In all models, I include a set of cohort dummy variables that capture 
differences across different cohorts of college students. Standard errors are clustered at the 
institution level. Because scores on the SAT exam are only available for a subset of students in 
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the sample, I examine the effects of performance assessment on students’ college outcomes with 
and without controlling for their SAT scores. 
As shown in model 1, prior to the implementation of performance assessment in fall 
2015, students with education majors were 1.5 percentage points more likely to persist into their 
senior year than students with other majors. The coefficient on the interaction term between 
education major and performance assessment is positive but not statistically significant, which 
suggests that the implementation of teacher performance assessment has no impact on 
persistence rate among students with education majors relative to other students. 
Table 10: Effects of Teacher Performance Assessment on Persistence in College 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES    
        
Education major 1.53* 2.86*** 3.35*** 
 (0.88) (0.69) (0.60) 
    
Performance assessment -15.77*** -13.79*** -27.01*** 
 (1.66) (1.52) (3.48) 
    
Education major * performance assessment 0.71 1.49 0.72 
 (1.31) (1.21) (1.18) 
    
Minority -0.08 0.90 1.14 
 (1.30) (0.82) (0.83) 
    
Female 1.31** 2.59*** 2.76*** 
 (0.55) (0.62) (0.69) 
    
Year of birth  0.80*** 0.58*** 0.66** 
 (0.22) (0.20) (0.24) 
    
In-state resident 6.77*** 9.86*** 9.76*** 
 (1.77) (1.21) (1.31) 
    
HS GPA 29.56*** 21.00*** 20.18*** 
 (1.50) (1.65) (1.57) 
    
HS graduation year  0.05 0.08 2.60*** 
 (0.32) (0.27) (0.71) 
    
Total financial aid (1st year) 0.03*** 0.02** 0.02** 
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 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    
Receive Pell grant (1st year) -8.31*** -5.54*** -4.74*** 
 (0.88) (0.83) (0.84) 
    
SAT math    0.01* 
   (0.00) 
    
Cohort FE YES YES YES 
Institution FE NO YES YES 
Observations 184,812 184,812 147,590 
R-squared 0.13 0.15 0.15 
Note: All regression coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. Clustered standard errors in 
parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In model 2, I control for institution-level fixed effects to account for any time-invariant 
characteristics of postsecondary institutions that might affect student persistence in college. The 
coefficient on the interaction between education major and performance assessment is still 
positive and not statistically significant at the conventional levels. Model 3 shows the effects of 
performance assessment on college persistence after controlling for students’ scores on the SAT 
math exam. Consistent with the first two models, the coefficient on education major is positive 
and highly significant, which suggests that, prior to 2015, education majors were more likely to 
persist into their senior year than students with other majors. However, there is no evidence that 
teacher performance assessment has affected college persistence of students with education 
major relative to other students. 
The coefficients for the control variables have the expected sign. For instance, the results 
from table 10 show that female students are more likely than male students to persist in college 
by somewhere between 1.3 and 2.8 percentage points. Also, students who receive a Pell grant in 
their first year are less likely to persist in college than other students. 
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3.5.2 Attrition from Education Major 
In table 11, I examine whether teacher performance assessment has increased attrition 
from education majors. In all models, the dependent variable is measured using a binary variable 
that takes 1 if a student has changed his/her major between first and senior years of college and 
zero otherwise.  
Across all specifications, the coefficient on education major is negative and highly 
significant. This indicates that students with education majors were less likely to change their 
college majors compared to other students, prior to the implementation of performance in fall 
2015. For example, model 1 shows that, prior to 2015, students in education programs were 8.9 
percentage points less likely to change their college majors than other students. Estimates from 
models 1 and 2 show that the coefficient on the interaction term between education major and 
performance assessment is not statistically significant at the conventional levels which suggests 
that the introduction of teacher performance assessment has no impact on students’ attrition from 
education majors relative to other students. The results from model 3, however, show that 
performance assessment is associated with a 4.2 percentage points decline in attrition from 
education major relative to other majors. This effect is only significant at the 10 percent level. 
It should be noted that using change of college major as a dependent variable may be 
problematic, and, therefore, subject to measurement error. The reason is that, during a given 
semester, students may declare themselves in a specific major without satisfying the requirement 
for that major. In other words, change of college major does not imply that students have met or 
failed to meet certain requirements of a specific program. 
 
65 
 
Table 11: Effects of Teacher Performance Assessment on the Probability of Changing College 
Major 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES    
        
Education major -8.92*** -8.23*** -7.38*** 
 (1.50) (1.44) (1.42) 
    
Performance assessment -4.60** -2.92 -11.82*** 
 (1.76) (1.77) (2.02) 
    
Education major * performance assessment -2.81 -2.09 -4.22* 
 (2.59) (2.35) (2.34) 
    
Minority -5.79*** -3.05*** -2.81*** 
 (1.38) (0.60) (0.54) 
    
Female 3.64** 2.96** 2.30** 
 (1.61) (1.09) (1.00) 
    
Year of birth  0.19 0.00 0.07 
 (0.40) (0.25) (0.30) 
    
In-state resident 10.70** 7.67*** 7.72*** 
 (4.88) (2.19) (2.09) 
    
HS GPA 8.78* 2.16 2.25 
 (4.31) (1.36) (1.41) 
    
HS graduation year  0.77 0.75** 2.42*** 
 (0.49) (0.32) (0.53) 
    
Total financial aid (1st year)   -0.01** 
   (0.01) 
    
Receive Pell grant (1st year) 0.02* 0.01* 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    
SAT math  -3.38** -1.29* -0.86 
 (1.53) (0.67) (0.75) 
    
Cohort FE YES YES YES 
Institution FE NO YES YES 
Observations 184,812 184,812 147,590 
R-squared 0.02 0.06 0.06 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
Note: All regression coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. Clustered standard 
errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.5.3 Degree Completion 
Table 12 presents regression estimates for the effect of teacher performance assessment 
on the probability of graduating within four years. Across all models, students with an education 
major were more likely to graduate from college within four years compared to students with 
other majors, prior to fall 2015. For example, estimates from model 1 suggest that, prior to 2015, 
students with an education major were 4.7 percentage points more likely than other students to 
graduate from college within four years. This effect is robust across different specifications. The 
coefficient on the interaction terms between education major and performance assessment, 
however, is negative but cannot be distinguished from zero. 
Table 12: Effects of Teacher Performance Assessment on Four-Year Degree Completion 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES    
        
Education major 1.53* 5.59*** 6.01*** 
 (0.88) (0.95) (0.82) 
 
   
Performance assessment -15.77*** 2.28 -0.43 
 (1.66) (1.44) (2.44) 
 
   
Education major * performance assessment 0.71 1.92 2.07 
 (1.31) (1.47) (1.67) 
 
   
Minority -0.08 -0.73 -0.35 
 (1.30) (1.04) (1.12) 
 
   
Female 1.31** 6.78*** 8.40*** 
 (0.55) (1.11) (1.13) 
 
   
Year of birth  0.80*** 0.50** 0.56* 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.32) 
 
   
In-state resident 6.77*** -2.44*** -1.77** 
 (1.77) (0.84) (0.85) 
 
   
HS GPA 29.56*** 17.34*** 16.84*** 
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 (1.50) (1.30) (1.29) 
 
   
HS graduation year  0.05 -0.79*** -0.35 
 (0.32) (0.28) (0.41) 
 
   
Total financial aid (1st year) 0.03*** -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   
Receive Pell grant (1st year) -8.31*** -4.14*** -3.85*** 
 (0.88) (0.38) (0.35) 
 
   
SAT math    0.03*** 
   (0.00) 
    
Cohort FE YES YES YES 
Institution FE NO YES YES 
    
Observations 184,812 184,812 147,590 
R-squared 0.13 0.17 0.17 
Note: All regression coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. Clustered standard 
errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section, I examine the sensitivity of the results to multiple sample restrictions and 
alternative specifications. In general, the results are consistent with the baseline analysis in 
section 5. There is no evidence the teacher prep performance assessment affects students’ 
persistence in college, attrition from education majors, or the likelihood of graduating within 4 
years. 
3.6.1 Changing the Control Group 
A major concern about the main results in section 5 is that students with education majors 
may be systematically different from other students. In fact, as shown in table 9, students with 
education majors differ from other students across most of the baseline characteristics such as 
race, age, and high school achievement. However, to the extent that the changes over time in 
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college outcomes are similar across both the treatment and the control groups, the differences in 
baseline characteristics between the two groups will not bias the estimates from the DID model. 
Nonetheless, I account for the differences between students in education majors and other 
students by following two approaches. First, I exclude individuals who majored in science from 
the control group. This includes all individuals who majored in Engineering & Technology, 
Architecture & Related Services, Biological & Biomedical Sciences, and Physical Sciences. The 
reason is that students who major in science tend to be very different from students who choose 
other majors in terms of both observable characteristics such as socio-economic status and 
college preparedness, and unobservable characteristics such as motivation. The regressions 
estimates from this specification are reported in column 1 of table 13. Consistent with the main 
analysis, there are no effects of performance assessment on college outcomes of students with 
education majors relative to other students. 
Second, I use nearest neighbor propensity score matching (without caliper) to select a 
control group that looks similar to the treatment group in terms of baseline characteristics.17 
Table A5 in the appendix shows the average marginal effects from the propensity score equation 
whereas figure A2 compares the pre-and post-matching standardized bias from the PSM model.18 
Overall, the average standardized bias is reduced by more than 94% after matching. The 
                                                          
17 First, I use nearest neighbor Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to estimate propensity scores for individuals in the 
sample using the following variables: race, gender, age, high school GPA, year of graduation from high school, 
residency status, score on SAT math exam, eligibility for financial aid, in addition to cohort and institution fixed 
effects. Then, I assign a propensity score weight for each individual. The propensity score weight is equal to 1 for 
students in education programs and 𝑒𝑖/(1 − 𝑒𝑖) for students with other majors, where 𝑒𝑖 is the propensity score for 
individual i estimated by the PSM model. The effect of teacher performance assessment is then estimated using a 
DID model that incorporates propensity score weights. 
18 Standardized bias represents the standardized difference in mean characteristics between eligible and ineligible 
students. It is calculated for each covariate (represented by a horizontal line in Fig. A2) included in the eligibility 
equation before and after matching. 
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estimates from the PSM model are shown in column 2 in table 13. The results suggest that 
teacher prep performance assessment doesn’t affect students’ college outcomes. 
3.6.2 Excluding Students Who Change their Majors 
Another concern about the main results in section 3.5 is that students may change their 
major during the course of their postsecondary education. Therefore, the binary variable on 
education major may be measured with error. This may bias the effects of performance 
assessment on college persistence and degree attainment. To account for this limitation, I restrict 
the sample to students who did not change their major and re-estimate the effects of performance 
assessment on these two outcomes. 
Table 13: Sensitivity of Results to Choice of the Control Group 
 (1) (2) 
  Exclude Science Majors Matched Control Group 
College Persistence 1.63 1.73 
 (1.20) (1.29) 
   
Attrition from Education Majors -2.68 -2.24 
 (2.41) (2.29) 
   
Graduating Within 4 Years 1.28 1.93 
 (1.50) (1.36) 
   
Sample size  141,787 184,812 
Note: All regression coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. Clustered standard 
errors in parentheses 
 
As shown in table 14, there is no effect of performance assessment on either college 
persistence or the likelihood of graduating with four years among students with education 
majors. These results are consistent with the main effects in tables 10 and 12. 
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Table 14: Sensitivity of Results to Excluding Students Who Changed their Majors 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 
College 
Persistence 
Graduation Within 4 
Years 
      
Education Major * Performance 
Assessment 1.08 0.93 
 (1.68) (1.23) 
Observations 94,014 94,014 
R-squared 0.1967 0.1747 
Note: All regression coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. Clustered standard 
errors in parentheses 
 
3.6.3 Pre-treatment Trends 
A key assumption of the DID is that both the treatment and control groups have similar 
trends overtime. That is, changes in college outcomes for students in education programs are 
similar to the changes in outcomes for other students. If the DID assumption is plausible, then 
there should not be significant differences in outcomes between students with education major 
and other students among pre-treatment cohorts. However, if these differences exist, then the 
observable effect of performance assessment may be due to pre-existing differences between the 
two groups. To test the validity of this assumption, I include a set of interaction terms between 
the binary variable on education major and school year dummies. Using this set of interaction 
terms, I examine whether a) the parallel trend assumption is plausible by assessing whether the 
pre-treatment trends are similar for both the treatment and control groups; and b) the 
announcement of the new performance requirements prior to its implementation in fall 2015 has 
any impact on students’ college outcomes. 
Figure 6 shows the regression coefficients on the interaction terms between education 
major and each school year dummy, along with 95 percent confidence intervals. It should be 
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noted that the outcomes observed for each school year represent 4-year outcomes. For example, 
college persistence observed in school year 2012-13 represents the persistence of students who 
started college in 2009-10 into their senior year. The base year in figure 2 is school year 2011-
12. As can be seen, the differences between the treatment and control groups in the pre-treatment 
period are not statistically significant which suggests that the two groups have very similar trends 
prior to the introduction on performance assessment. In addition, consistent with the results from 
the main analysis, teacher prep performance has no effect on persistence into senior year of 
college, attrition from education majors, or graduation within four years. 
 
Figure 6: Effects of Teacher Prep Assessment on College Outcomes 
Note: The base years is 2011-12. 
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3.7 Subgroup Analysis 
This section examines whether the effects of teacher performance assessment vary based 
on students’ demographic characteristics and high school achievement. First, I examine the 
extent to which performance assessment has affected the college outcomes of students who are 
underrepresented in education programs: male students and minority students. Table 15 presents 
the coefficients on the interaction term between education major and performance assessment for 
each outcome. Columns 1 and 2 provide the results for minority and white students while 
columns 3 and 4 show the results for male and female students, respectively. Across all different 
subgroups of college students, there is no evidence that teacher performance assessment affects 
students’ persistence into their senior year, attrition from education major, or the likelihood of 
graduating within four years. 
Table 15: Heterogeneous Effects of Teacher Performance Assessment by Race and Gender 
  Race Gender 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Minority White Male Female 
College Persistence 1.18 1.85 2.38 0.87 
 (1.64) (1.46) (2.27) (1.32) 
     
Attrition from Education Majors -1.16 -2.70 -2.71 -1.62 
 (2.55) (2.83) (2.44) (2.70) 
     
Graduating Within 4 Years 0.10 3.17 1.42 2.03 
 (1.43) (1.88) (1.19) (1.64) 
     
Sample size  83,295 101,517 82,676 102,136 
Note: All regression coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. Clustered standard 
errors in parentheses 
 
In table 16, I examine whether increasing the costs of becoming a teacher by imposing 
new performance requirements has discouraged highly talented individuals from choosing 
education majors. Using students’ high school GPA, I create four binary variables that 
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distinguish between students in the first, second, third, and fourth quartile of the GPA 
distribution. Then, I estimate the effect of performance assessment for each of the four groups. 
Overall, the results show no effects of performance assessment on college outcomes of students 
in the bottom 50 percent of the high school GPA distribution. Students in the top 25 percent are 
also not affected by the implementation of teacher prep performance assessment. There is some 
evidence, however, that performance assessment is associated with an increase in college 
persistence among students in the third quartile of the GPA distribution. Estimates from table 16 
also indicate that performance assessment is associated with a decline in attrition from education 
major among this group of students. This effect, however, is only significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
Table 16: Effects of Teacher Performance Assessment by High School Achievement 
   1st Quartile  2nd Quartile  3rd Quartile  4th Quartile 
College Persistence -2.13 2.07 5.55*** -0.76 
 (1.77) (2.20) (1.54) (1.45) 
     
Attrition from Education Majors -3.22 0.93 -5.48* -1.60 
 (3.36) (2.45) (2.85) (3.91) 
     
Graduating Within 4 Years -0.35 1.54 2.34 3.22 
 (0.63) (1.51) (2.32) (4.16) 
     
Sample size  48,181 47,703 46,103 42,825 
Note: All regression coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. Clustered standard 
errors in parentheses 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This paper examines the effect of teacher performance assessment on college outcomes 
of students with education major relative to other students.  I use administrative data from the 
University System of Georgia (USG) that includes information on students who started their 
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postsecondary education in Georgia between academic years 2008-09 and 2016-17. To examine 
the effect of teacher performance assessment on college outcomes, I use a difference-in-
differences approach in which I compare the outcomes of students with education major to the 
same outcomes for students with no education major before and after the introduction of teacher 
performance assessment in Georgia in fall 2015. 
The results from this essay suggest that teacher prep performance assessment has no 
effects on students’ college persistence, attrition from education majors, or the likelihood of 
graduating within four years. These findings are consistent across different robustness checks. 
For example, when excluding students who majored in sciences from the control group, I still 
find no effect of teacher performance assessment on students’ college outcomes. I also find no 
effect of the new performance assessment requirements on the outcomes of students who are 
underrepresented in education programs such as minority and male students. 
These findings have important policy implications. First, the results suggest that teacher 
performance assessment has no impact on the compositions of students in education majors. This 
indicates that one of key assumptions behind the implementing performance assessment, i.e., 
teacher performance assessment serves as a “screening tool” that keeps less qualified teacher 
candidates out of the profession, is not supported by the findings from this chapter. These null 
effects, however, do not necessarily suggest that performance assessment does not affect teacher 
quality. It only indicates that performance assessment doesn’t deter less qualified candidates 
from choosing education as a major. Teacher performance assessment may improve teacher 
quality through other channels that are not tested in this chapter. For example, performance 
assessment may ensure that newly certified teachers can meet minimum performance standards 
as measured by the edTPA assessment which might improve teacher quality. Teacher 
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performance assessment may also help preparation programs identify whether their teaching 
practices or curriculum are effective at preparing candidates to succeed in the classroom. 
Second, critics of teacher performance assessment argue that it increases the barriers of 
becoming a teacher and, therefore, disproportionately affects specific subgroups of teacher 
candidates, such as minority individuals. The findings from this chapter, however, indicate that 
the effects of performance assessment are similar across all students, i.e., the introduction of 
teacher performance assessment doesn’t negatively affect college outcomes of students who are 
underrepresented in education programs such as male students and minority students. 
These results, however, should be interpreted with cautious for several reasons. First, the 
effects of teacher performance assessment may be driven by policy changes that happened at the 
same time of implementing the new performance requirements in fall 2015. Second, the results 
could also be affected by any unobservable time-variant factors that affect students’ college 
outcomes. To the extent that these unobservable factors affect both the treatment and control in 
similar ways, the results from the DID model will not be biased. However, if these time-variant 
factors have disproportionate effects on students in education programs, then the estimates from 
the DID model will be biased. Third, this essay focuses mainly on the short-term effects of 
performance assessment requirements since these requirements are still in its early stages of 
implementation. As a result, the effects of performance assessment may change as teacher 
candidates and educator programs become more familiar with the new performance assessment. 
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Chapter IV: Former Teachers: Who They Are, Why They Leave and What Factors Affect 
Their Decisions to Come Back 
4.1 Introduction 
Research on the teacher labor market has largely focused on the career choices of current 
teachers (Boyd et al. 2005b, Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin 2004b). Student socio-economic 
characteristics, schools’ working conditions, and teacher qualifications seem to be key 
determinants of teacher mobility and attrition. Teachers are more likely to leave schools with 
large shares of low-income and minority students. Little is known on the labor supply decisions 
of former teachers. 
The lack of evidence on the supply decisions of former teachers is problematic for several 
reasons. First, former teachers represent an important source of teacher supply in the United 
States. For example, according to the School and Staffing Survey (SASS), former teachers 
represented 49 percent of teachers entering the teaching workforce in school year 2011-12.19 
Second, the costs and uncertainty associated with hiring former teachers are likely to be lower 
than those associated with hiring new teachers, because hiring authorities can rely on the past 
performance to assess their quality. 
Third, demand for teachers is expected to grow during the next decade due to both 
increased student enrollment and high attrition rates among current teachers. For example, the 
school-going population is expected to increase in the next decade by roughly 3 million students 
(Sutcher, Darling-Hammond, and Carver-Thomas 2016). However, about 8 percent of the 
teaching workforce exit annually, which puts pressure on schools to hire new teachers. The 
increase in demand for teachers doesn’t pose a serious challenge to schools as long as there are 
                                                          
19 In school year 2007-08, former teachers represented 37 percent of those entering the teaching workforce. 
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enough new teachers to fill teaching vacancies. However, between 2008-09 and 2014-15, the 
number of individuals attending teacher preparation programs declined by 42 percent, and the 
number who completed these programs declined by over 23 percent. In addition, data from ACT 
entrance exam indicates that high school students are showing less interest in teaching. In 2014, 
for example, only 5 percent of high school students who took the ACT exam expressed an 
interest in pursuing education as a profession, compared to 34 percent in 2010 (ACT 2015).  
Former teachers represent a potentially significant source of teacher supply that school 
district can rely on to meet the expected increase in demand for teachers. Compared to other 
college-educated workers, teachers are more likely to return to their profession after their initial 
exit. (Flyer and Rosen, 1997). Between 25 percent and 33 percent of teachers who exit return to 
teaching (DeAngelis and Presley 2007, Stinebrickner 2002). 
This essay examines three main research questions: 
• What are the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of former 
teachers? 
• Why do teachers leave their profession and what are their post-teaching career 
paths?  
• What are factors that affect the decisions of former teachers to return to 
teaching? 
To answer these questions, I use a restricted-use data from the Beginning Teacher 
Longitudinal Study (BTLS) administered by the U.S. Department of Education. The BLTS 
follows a cohort of first-time teachers for five years, starting from school year 2007-08. The 
survey collects information on schools’ characteristics, teachers’ demographic and socio-
economic characteristics, and teacher labor market outcomes. The results suggest that about 25 
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percent of teachers left the profession during the first 5 years of their career, 38 percent of them 
after the first year. About 18 percent of former teachers reported leaving teaching because of 
pregnancy or to care for a child. However, the majority of those who left teaching reported other 
reasons. For example, 7 percent have left to look for jobs with better financial benefits and 18 
percent have left because of dissatisfaction with schools, students or school environment in 
general. Out of those who left teaching at any point during the 5-year study period, 29 percent 
still work in the field of education, 20 percent are working outside the field of education, 16 
percent are unemployed, and 35 percent are out of labor force.  
Also, 23 percent of all leavers return to teaching at least once during the 5-year study 
period. Former teachers who work in large schools, high schools, and schools with large 
percentages of minority students are less likely to return to teaching after their initial exit. Highly 
paid teachers are also more likely to re-enter teaching: A one-thousand-dollar increase in school 
salary increases the likelihood of returning to teaching by 0.5 percentage points. The findings 
also indicate that teachers who left schools because of pregnancy or change in residence are also 
more likely to re-enter the profession. 
4.2 Literature Review 
Previous research on the teacher labor markets has mainly focused on career choices of 
current teachers. In general, student characteristics, teacher quality, early-career experience, and 
alternative certification are key determinants of teacher mobility, retention, and attrition. For 
example, using data on Texas elementary public schools, Hanushek et al. (2004a) found that 
schools with large numbers of minority and academically disadvantaged students tend to lose a 
higher fraction of teachers each year, especially among white teachers. Scafidi et al. (2007) 
found that teachers in public elementary schools in Georgia are more likely to leave schools with 
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lower test scores and schools with large shares of low-income and minority students. Other 
studies reached similar conclusions (Boyd et al. 2005a). 
One potential explanation for the high turnover of teachers in high-poverty schools is the 
working conditions within these schools (Boyd et al. 2011, Johnson, Kraft, and Papay 2012, 
Ladd 2011, Loeb, Darling-Hammond, and Luczak 2005). Loeb et al. (2005) found that teacher 
salaries, class size, facilities, school resources, and other working conditions are strong 
predictors of teacher turnover in California. They also found that controlling for working 
conditions diminished the effect of student characteristics on teacher turnover significantly. 
Using data from Massachusetts, Johnson et al. (2012) found that most of the effect of student 
demographics on teacher turnover can be explained by differences in school culture, principal’s 
leadership, and relationship among colleagues. Ladd (2011) also found that perceptions of 
working conditions account for 15 percent of the variation in actual departure rates. Teacher 
salaries play a key role in determining teacher mobility (Imazeki 2005, Kirby, Berends, and 
Naftel 1999). For example, using data on public school teachers in Texas, Kirby et al. (1999) 
found that a $1,000 increase in teacher salary reduced attrition by 2.9 percent. Imazeki (2005) 
also found that increasing teacher salaries in Wisconsin reduces attrition among new teachers. 
Teachers with high pre-service qualifications (measured by their ACT score, certification 
level, and educational attainment) are more likely to leave schools with large shares of poor and 
low-performing students than less qualified teachers (Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff 2002, 
Podgursky, Monroe, and Watson 2004b). For example, Podgursky et al. (2004b) and Lankford et 
al. (2002) found that less qualified teachers in Missouri and New York State, respectively, tend 
to sort into low-income and minority schools, especially those in urban areas. Their results also 
indicate that highly qualified teachers have higher turnover rate than other teachers. Using data 
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from the Schooling and Staffing Survey (SASS), Ingersoll et al. (2014) found that teachers with 
more training in teaching methods and pedagogy-- especially practice teaching, observation of 
other classroom teaching and feedback on their own teaching—were far less likely to leave 
teaching after their first year on the job. However, they found no evidence that college 
selectivity, educational degree, or certification type affect teacher retention. 
Teacher quality also plays a role in teacher mobility. Previous research suggests that 
high-quality teachers, measured using teacher value added, are less likely to leave schools and 
the teaching profession in general (Boyd et al. 2011, Goldhaber, Gross, and Player 2011, 
Hanushek and Rivkin 2010, Krieg 2006). For example, Krieg (2006) found that fourth-grade 
teachers in Washington State with high value-added scores are less likely to leave schools. 
Similarly, using data on elementary and middle school teachers in New York City, Boyd et al. 
(2008) found that first-year high-quality teachers have lower probability of leaving public 
schools in both low-achieving and high-achieving schools. Goldhaber et al. (2011) found that 
teachers in the lowest quintile of the performance distribution have higher probabilities of 
moving to another school within a district, changing school district, and leaving the public school 
system. Feng and Sass (2017) found no evidence that teacher quality affects teacher mobility 
within or across districts in Florida. They found, however, that teachers from both the top and 
lowest quartiles are more likely to leave the public school sector than teachers from the middle of 
the quality distribution. Their results also suggest that teacher mobility tends to increase the 
achievement gap between white and minority students and between poor and more affluent 
students. 
The effect of performance pay on teacher retention and mobility is inconclusive 
(Podgursky and Springer 2007). While some studies have found performance pay has a positive 
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impact on the retention of high-quality teachers (Dee and Wyckoff 2015), results from other 
studies question this effect (Glazerman and Seifullah 2012). For example, Dee and Wyckoff 
(2015) found that a teacher evaluation system in Washington D.C., called IMPACT, has 
increased the turnover of low-performing teachers by 11 percentage points. In contrast, 
Glazerman and Seifullah (2012) found no consistent effects of the Chicago Teacher 
Advancement Program (Chicago TAP) on teacher retention.  
In addition to performance pay, alternative certification also affects teachers’ mobility 
and attrition. Prior research has shown that alternatively certified teachers tend to have higher 
attrition rates than traditionally certified teachers. Using data on all teachers from New York City 
between from 2000-01 to 2007-08, Boyd et al. (2012) found that teachers from the Teach For 
America (TFA) program are more likely than other teachers to transfer or exit teaching, after 
their second and third year in teaching. For example, they found that, after year 3, 67 percent of 
TFA teachers exit teaching, compared to 31 percent for teachers from the NYC Teaching 
Fellows program and 20 percent for traditionally certified teachers. Using national data from the 
SASS survey, Redding & Smith (2016) found that, by school year 2007-08, alternatively 
certified teacher were 10 percentage points more likely to exit school than teachers from 
traditional programs within 8 years, a gap that persists even after controlling for several teacher 
and school characteristics.  
Despite the large literature on teacher mobility and retention, few studies have examined 
the labor supply decisions of former teachers. For example, DeAngelis and Presley (2007) found 
that, in Illinois, more than a third of new teachers that leave eventually return to teaching; 
between 8 and 17 percent return after just one year. Beaudin (1993) found that the likelihood of 
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returning to teaching was lower for teachers in subject areas with high opportunity costs (e.g., 
physical sciences and mathematics), and less experienced, younger teachers. 
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class of 1972 
(NLS-72), Stinebrickner (2002) found that about one third of teachers who exit teaching return to 
the profession within five years. He also found that the decision to leave teaching is mainly 
driven by changes in teachers’ family circumstances, especially the birth of a child. Grissom and 
Reininger (2012) found that more experienced teachers, as well as women, are more likely to 
return to teaching. 
4.3 Data 
The data for this study come from the Beginning Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS) 
administered by the U.S. Department of Education. The BLTS follows a cohort of first-time 
teachers for five years, starting in 2007-08. The survey collects information on schools’ 
characteristics, teachers’ demographic and socio-economic characteristics, and teacher labor 
market outcomes. In this chapter, I examine the characteristics of teachers who exit teaching 
during their early career in addition to the key determinants that affect their likelihood of 
returning to the profession. 
The dependent variable is re-entry into teaching. I measure this variable using a binary 
variable that indicates whether former teachers have returned to teaching in a given year after 
their initial exit. This includes teachers who returned to teaching in public or private schools. I 
examine the effects of six groups of independent variables on former teachers’ decisions to 
return to their profession: teachers’ demographic characteristics, pre-service qualifications, 
schools’ characteristics, former teachers’ reported reasons for leaving teaching and current 
occupational status, and economic conditions within a state. 
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The first group includes teachers’ demographic characteristics, measured using teachers’ 
age, gender, and race. The second group includes teachers’ pre-service qualifications which are 
measured using teachers’ certification level, college major, and type of postsecondary degrees. 
Certification level is coded as 1 for alternatively certified teachers and zero otherwise. College 
majors is measured using a binary variable that takes 1 for teachers with education major and 
zero otherwise while postsecondary degree is also measured using a binary variable that takes 1 
for teachers who have BA degree only and zero otherwise. 
The third group of independent variables includes schools’ characteristics such as school 
enrollment, shares of minority teachers and students, student-teacher ratio, teachers’ base salary, 
in addition to two binary variables that indicate whether a school is charter or secondary school, 
respectively. The fourth group of variables describes the current occupational status of former 
teachers, measured using five binary variables that indicate whether former teachers are 
currently unemployed, caring for a family member, working outside the field of education, 
working inside the field of education, or reported other activity. 
I also examine whether former teachers’ reported reasons for leaving teaching predict 
their likelihood of returning to the profession. This group includes six binary variables that 
indicate whether former teachers exit their profession due to contract non-renewal, financial 
needs, change in residence, pregnancy, dissatisfaction with teaching; to pursue positions other 
than teaching; or for other reasons. The last group of variables, state’s economic conditions, 
examines whether economic conditions within a state affect former teachers’ likelihood of 
reentering teaching after their initial exit. This group includes state median wage, unemployment 
rate, and teacher median wage. 
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Table 17 presents summary statistics for the full sample. Panel (A) shows characteristics 
of teachers while panel (B) provides characteristics of schools. As shown in panel (A), 68 
percent of teachers in the sample are females and 90 percent are white. The average age in the 
sample is 35 years. About 28 percent of teachers are alternatively certified, 63 percent graduated 
from education programs, and 75 percent have a Bachelor degree only. The average teacher 
salary is $33,622 in 2008 dollars. Overall, about 51 percent of schools in the sample are 
secondary schools and 6 percent are charter schools. Table 17 also shows that, during the 5-year 
period of the BTLS survey, 25 percent of teachers left teaching and 6 percent returned to the 
professions after their initial exit. 
Figure 7 depicts the share of teachers who left, stayed, moved, or returned to teaching 
during each wave of the BTLS survey, out of all teachers in the sample. As shown, in school 
year 2008-09, 68 percent of teachers stayed in their schools, 15 percent moved to another school, 
and 10 percent exit teaching. Over time, the share of teachers who stayed in their schools has 
declined while the share of teachers who left teaching has increased. For example, between 
school year 2008-09 and 2011-12, the percentage of teachers who stayed in the same school 
decreased from 68 percent to 53 percent whereas the percentage of leavers has increased from 10 
percent to 17 percent. A small percentage of teachers (2 percent) in the sample have returned to 
teaching after their initial exit. 
Table 17: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
A) Teacher-level Characteristics   
Female 67.9 - 
White 89.8 - 
Age 34.6 8.6 
Alternative certification 27.5 - 
Education major 63 - 
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BA degree 74.3 - 
Teacher salary $33,622 $7,450 
Leaver 24.8 - 
Returner 5.6 - 
B) School-level Characteristics   
School enrollment 781.4 634.2 
% Minority teachers 14.8 22.3 
% Minority students 42.2 35.2 
Student-teacher ratio 14.8 5.3 
Secondary school 51.2 50.0 
Charter school 5.8 23.3 
Sample size 1990  
 
 
Figure 7: Shares of Stayers, Movers, Leavers, and Returners per Survey Wave 
Figure A3 in the appendix depicts the share of former teachers who left during each wave 
of the BTLS survey, out of all teachers who exit teaching during the 5-year period. As shown, a 
large portion of those who left teaching exit the profession after the first year. For example, 38 
percent of all leavers exit teaching after the first year (wave 2 leavers), compared to 24 percent 
after the second year (wave 3 leavers), 22 percent after the third year (wave 4 leavers) and 15 
percent after the fourth year (wave 5 leavers). Figure A4 shows the share of teachers who 
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returned to teaching out of all teachers who left the profession during the first 5 years. As can be 
seen, out of all leavers, 23 percent returned to teaching at one point during the study period. Out 
of which, 37 percent returned during the third year (wave 3 returners), 31 percent returned during 
the fourth year (wave 4 returners), and 32 percent returned during the fifth year (wave 5 
returners). 
Table 18 presents the percentage of former teachers who returned during each of the last 
three years of the survey period (school years 2009-10 to 2011-12) for each cohort of leavers. 
For example, column 1 provides the percentage of wave 2 leavers; i.e., those who left after the 
first year, who returned in the 3rd, 4th, or 5th year of the survey. As shown, 23 percent of wave 2 
leavers returned to teaching in wave 3 (i.e., in school year 2009-10), 8 percent returned in wave 4 
and 3 percent returned in wave 5. Overall, 33 percent of those who left teaching after school year 
2007-08 returned during the last three years of the survey. Similarly, 25 percent of those who left 
teaching after school year 2008-09 (wave 3 leavers) returned in school years 2010-11 and 2011-
12 (waves 4 and 5) whereas 21 percent of those who left after school year 2009-10 (wave 4 
leavers) returned in school year 2011-12. 
Table 18: Returners by Each Cohort of Leavers 
  Leavers 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Returner 
Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 
(Left after 2007-08) (Left after 2008-09) (Left after 2009-10) 
Wave 3 (2009-10) 22.6 - - 
Wave 4 (2010-11) 7.9 17.8 - 
Wave 5 (2011-12) 2.6 7.6 20.7 
Sample size 190 120 110 
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4.3.1 Who Leaves Teaching and Why? 
Table 19 provides mean differences between teachers who left at any time during the 
BTLS 5-year period (leavers) and teachers who stayed in the profession (stayers). Minority 
teachers, alternatively certified teachers, teachers who didn’t major in education, and teachers 
with more than a BA degree are more likely to leave teaching. Table 19 also shows that teachers 
who work in charter schools or schools with large numbers of minority students and teachers are 
more likely to exit teaching.  
Table 19: Mean Differences between Leavers and Stayers 
  Leaver Stayer   
Female 67.8 68.0  
White 87.2 90.6 *** 
Age 35.6 34.2 *** 
Alter certification 29.6 26.8 *** 
Education major 57.3 64.8 *** 
BA degree 74.3 78.5 *** 
Teacher salary 32,800 33,900 *** 
School enrollment 837.7 741.8 *** 
% Minority teachers 18.5 14.3 *** 
% Minority students 48.1 41.6 *** 
Student-teacher ratio 15.0 14.9 *** 
Secondary school 53.0 53.3 *** 
Charter school 10.1 5.1 *** 
Sample size 490 1500  
Note: Asterisks indicate significant differences at the conventional levels. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
As shown in figure 8, about 18 percent of all leavers have left because of pregnancy or to 
care for a child, but 82 percent left for other reasons. For example, 12 percent left because they 
moved, 7 percent have left to look for jobs with better financial benefits, and 18 percent have left 
because of dissatisfaction with schools, students or school environment in general. Also, more 
than 31 percent of teachers have left for other reasons such as retiring, having concern about job 
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security, not being able to pass the required test(s), or taking courses to improve career 
opportunities.20 
 
Figure 8: Most Important Reasons for Leaving Teaching 
Note: Out of all leavers, only 49 percent reported their reasons for leaving teaching. 
Figure 9 shows the most important reasons for leaving teaching that are reported for each 
wave of leavers. As can be seen, the percentage of those who left teaching because of 
dissatisfaction with schools/students or school environment, in general, has increased sharply 
overtime. Only 7 percent of wave 2 leavers reported leaving because of dissatisfaction with their 
schools compared to 27 percent of wave 3 and wave 4 leavers. Similarly, the percentage of 
teachers who left because of pregnancy or to care for a child has increased from 15 percent in 
wave 2 to 20 percent and 22 percent among leavers in waves 3 and wave 4 respectively. In 
contrast, the percentage of former teachers who leave to look for jobs with better financial 
benefits has declined from 15 in wave 3 percent to 12 percent in wave 4. 
                                                          
20 About 28 percent of all leavers exit teaching because their contracts were not renewed. Figure A5 in the appendix 
shows the share of former teachers who left due to contract non-renewal during each wave. 
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Figure 9: Most Important Reasons for Leaving Teaching by Wave 
4.3.2 Employment and Occupational Statuses of Former Teachers 
Table 20 presents the employment and occupational statuses of all leavers in the sample. 
Out of those who left teaching at any point during the 5-year study period, 29 percent still work 
in the field of education, either in non-regular K-12 teaching position in a school or a school 
district or in a position in the field of pre-k or postsecondary education. About 20 percent are 
working outside the field of education, 16 percent are unemployed, and 35 percent are out of the 
labor force. 
Figure 10 shows the current occupational status for each wave of leavers. As shown, 
among those who left after the first year (wave 2 leavers), 25 percent work inside the field of 
education, 21 percent have a job outside the field, 11 percent are currently caring for a family 
member, and 17 percent are unemployed. The figure also shows that compared to wave 2 
leavers, wave 3 and wave 4 leavers are less likely to be unemployed and more likely to work 
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inside the field of education. That is, the longer you have been teaching, the more likely you are 
to work again as a teacher rather than in an alternative occupation. 
Table 20: Primary Activity of Former Teachers 
In labor force  
Working for a school or school district in a non-teaching position 21.9 
Working in a position in the field of pre-K or postsecondary education 7.1 
Occupation outside the field of education 20.4 
Unemployed 16.4 
Out of the labor force  
Caring for a family member 8.7 
Student at College or University 10.5 
Retired/disabled 1.0 
Others 10.7 
 
 
Figure 10: Occupational Status of Former Teachers by Wave 
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4.3.3 Who Returns to Teaching? 
Table 21 presents the differences in mean characteristics between former teachers who 
return to the profession and those who do not. As shown, female teachers, traditionally certified 
teachers, and teachers with education major are more likely to return to teaching, but teachers 
who work in large schools and high schools are less likely to re-enter teaching. 
Table 21: Mean Differences between Returners and Never-Returners 
  Returned  
 Yes No  
Female 75.9 65.4 ** 
White 88.4 86.9  
Age 34.3 36.0  
Alter certification 23.2 31.4 * 
Education major 68.9 53.9 *** 
BA degree 67.9 76.2 ** 
Teacher salary 33,465.4 32,622.1  
School-level characteristics    
School enrollment 637.4 772.4 ** 
% Minority teachers 15.9 19.2  
% Minority students 45.0 49.0  
Student-teacher ration 14.7 15.0  
Secondary school 38.4 57.3 *** 
Charter school 7.1 11.0  
Reasons for leaving    
Financial reasons 5.4 2.9  
Dissatisfaction with schools/students 8.9 8.9  
Pursue other positions 4.5 6.5  
Change in residence 8.0 5.8  
Pregnancy 8.9 8.9  
Contract not renewed 20.5 29.8 * 
Occupational status before returning    
Unemployed 11.6 22.5 ** 
Caring for a family member 5.4 15.2 *** 
Working outside the field of education 14.3 33.8 *** 
Working inside the field of education 11.6 22.5 ** 
Sample size 110 380  
Note: Asterisks indicate significant differences at the conventional levels. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.4 Methods and Results 
4.4.1 Empirical Strategy 
I estimate the impact of alternative certification on former teachers’ decisions to return to 
the profession using survival analysis. I use a discrete time hazard model that estimates the 
probability that an individual returns to teaching in a given year, conditional on not having 
returned in the previous year. The hazard function is specified as follows. 
𝜆𝑖(𝑡|𝑥𝑖) = 𝜆0(𝑡) exp{𝑥𝑖
′ 𝛽} 
where 𝜆0(𝑡) is a baseline hazard and 𝑥𝑖
′ 𝛽 is a vector of independent variables that includes 
teachers’ demographic characteristics, pre-service qualifications, schools’ characteristics, former 
teachers’ reported reasons for leaving teaching and current occupational status, and economic 
conditions within a state. This hazard function is estimated using a logistic regression, specified 
as follows. 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 [𝜆𝑖𝑠(𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑠)] = 𝛼0(𝑡) + 𝑥𝑖𝑠
′  𝛽 
where 𝜆𝑖(𝑡|𝑥𝑖), the dependent variable, represents the probability that a former teacher i in 
school s returns to the profession in a given year conditional on not having returned in the 
previous year. 
4.4.2 Baseline Results 
I begin the analysis by estimating a standard probit regression. The sample is restricted to 
teachers who left teaching at any point during their first five years. The dependent variable is 
measured using a binary variable that is coded as 1 for teachers who returned to teaching in a 
given year after their initial exit and zero otherwise. Column 1 in Table 22 reports the average 
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marginal effects from the probit model. Across all models, I control for state and year fixed 
effects.21  Standard errors are also clustered at the state level.  
As can be seen, neither gender nor race has an effect on the decisions’ of former teachers 
to return to the teaching professions. Age, however, has significant negative effect on the 
likelihood of returning to teaching. Each additional year of age reduces the likelihood of 
reentering teaching by 0.2 percentage points. The coefficient on alternative certification is 
negative but not statistically significant at the conventional levels. Estimates from column 1 also 
show that teachers who worked in high schools and schools with large shares of minority 
students are less likely to return to teaching by 2.8 and 0.08 percentage points respectively. 
Surprisingly, teachers who worked in schools with large shares of minority teachers are more 
likely to reenter teaching after their initial exit. The coefficient on the share of minority teachers 
indicates that each one percentage point increase in the share of minority teachers increases the 
likelihood of returning to the teaching profession by 0.1 percentage points.22 
Highly-paid teachers are more likely to return to teaching than others. A one-thousand-
dollar increase in teachers’ school salary increases the likelihood of retuning to teaching by 0.5 
percentage points. Former teachers with only BA degree are 6.5 percentage points less likely to 
return to teaching.  
                                                          
21 Over last two decades, four states have implemented paid family leave policies: California in 2004, New Jersey in 
2009, Rhode Island in 2014, and New York in 2018. The effect of paid family leave in Rhode Island and New York 
could not be estimated given that these policies were introduced years after the end of the BTLS survey. The effect 
of paid family leave in California and New Jersey, however, is captured using state fixed effects since the paid 
family leave policies in these two states were constant during the time period of the study.  
22 In table A6 in the appendix, I examine whether are non-linear effects of the shares of minority students and 
teachers of the former teachers’ likelihood of returning to teaching. The coefficients on the squared terms for both 
variables ate negative but cannot be distinguished from zero. 
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Column 1 also shows that former teachers’ decisions to re-enter the profession are 
affected by their current occupations or reasons for exiting teaching, respectively.23 As shown, 
former teachers who are currently caring for a family member are less likely to come back to 
teaching by 9.5 percentage points, as compared to unemployed former teachers. Former teachers 
who are currently working outside the field of education are also less likely to return to teaching 
by 4.4 percentage points than those who are currently unemployed. The findings also suggest 
that teachers who left teaching because of pregnancy are 4.7 percentage points more likely to 
return to teaching. Former teachers who left because of change in residence are also more likely 
to come back to teaching by 4.2 percentage points. Surprisingly, teachers who left teaching 
because of their dissatisfaction with their schools are more likely to re-enter teaching. State 
unemployment rate, median wage, or teacher median wage do not appear to affect the likelihood 
of returning to teaching. 
In column 2 of table 22, I examine the factors that affect former teachers’ decisions to 
return to the profession using a discrete time hazard model. This model estimates the probability 
that an individual returns to teaching in a given year conditional on not having returned in the 
previous year. Similar to the probit model, I control for state and year fixed effects. As shown, 
the results are very similar to the estimates from the probit regression. For example, estimates 
from column 2 suggest that alternative certification has no effect on the decisions of former 
teachers to return to the profession. The findings also indicate that low-paid teachers, teachers 
who work in schools with large percentage of minority students are less likely to re-enter 
                                                          
23 The baseline analysis in table 22 only includes former teachers who reported their reasons for leaving teaching. 
These teachers represent only 49 percent of all leavers. To examine whether the results are sensitive to excluding 
former teachers with missing values, I re-estimate both the probit and discrete time hazard models without 
controlling for former teachers’ reasons for leaving the teaching profession. The results are very similar to the 
estimates in table 22. 
95 
 
teaching after their initial exit. Former teachers who are currently caring for a family member are 
also less likely to return to teaching by about 9.6 percentage points. Similarly, former teachers 
who are currently working outside the field of education are less likely to re-enter teaching by 
somewhere between 4.3 percentage points. Teachers who exit teaching because of pregnancy or 
due to change in residence are more likely to come back to the profession. Surprisingly, teachers 
who left because of their satisfaction with schools are also more likely to return to teaching. 
Table 22: Average Marginal Effects on Returning to Teaching from Probit and Time Hazard 
Models 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Probit Discrete Time 
Hazard 
   
Female 0.185 1.067 
 (0.022) (0.026) 
   
White 1.172 0.197 
 (0.025) (0.032) 
   
Age -0.188** -0.193* 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
   
Alternative certification -1.837 -1.774 
 (0.024) (0.031) 
   
School enrollment 0.004 -0.006 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
   
% Minority teachers 0.142*** 0.127*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
% Minority students -0.079*** -0.084** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Student-teacher  ratio -0.134 -0.209 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
   
Secondary  school -2.796* -3.055 
 (0.017) (0.022) 
   
Charter school -2.163 -2.341 
 (0.023) (0.026) 
   
Education  major 2.608 2.412 
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 (0.024) (0.030) 
   
BA degree -6.424*** -5.540** 
 (0.017) (0.024) 
   
Teacher salary 0.516*** 0.529*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Current Occupation   
   
Caring for a family member -9.450*** -9.871*** 
 (0.032) (0.037) 
   
Working outside education -4.378*** -4.505** 
 (0.016) (0.021) 
   
Working inside education -1.835 -1.513 
 (0.022) (0.027) 
   
Other activity -1.239 -0.812 
 (0.016) (0.020) 
Reasons for leaving   
   
Financial benefits 5.619 5.279 
 (0.049) (0.061) 
   
Dissatisfaction with schools 7.230*** 7.832** 
 (0.024) (0.032) 
   
Pursue other positions 1.765 0.807 
 (0.041) (0.061) 
   
Change in residence 4.212** 4.509* 
 (0.021) (0.023) 
   
Pregnancy 4.727** 4.377 
 (0.024) (0.028) 
   
Contract not renewed -0.229 -0.219 
 (0.021) (0.024) 
   
State unemployment rate 1.104 0.939 
 (0.010) (0.012) 
   
Teacher median wage -0.060 -0.149 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
   
State median wage -0.819 -0.534 
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 (0.014) (0.017) 
   
State FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Observations 1,130 1,130 
Note: All regression coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. Clustered standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 23 tests the sensitivity of the results by excluding former teachers who still work 
inside the field of education (columns 1-2) and formers teachers who exit teaching because their 
contracts were not renewed (columns 3-4). Restricting the sample to former teachers who don’t 
work inside the field of education or those who left teaching voluntarily has very little effects on 
the results. Overall, the findings are consistent with the baseline analysis in table 22. Low-paid 
teachers and teachers who work in schools with large shares of minority students are less likely 
to return to the teaching profession after their initial exit. Also, former teachers who currently 
care for a family member or work outside the field of education are less likely to return to 
teaching. Teachers who exit teaching because of change in residence are more likely to reenter 
teaching. 
Table 23: Sensitivity Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Probit Discrete 
Time Hazard 
Probit Discrete 
Time Hazard 
     
Female 2.524 3.768 1.407 1.972 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.032) (0.035) 
     
White -1.105 -2.282 -1.508 -2.643 
 (0.027) (0.034) (0.031) (0.036) 
     
Age -0.187* -0.192 -0.220* -0.251 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
     
Alternative certification -1.018 -1.006 -1.287 -1.258 
 (0.030) (0.038) (0.027) (0.033) 
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School enrollment 0.166 0.176 -0.132 -0.178 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
     
% Minority teachers 0.189*** 0.169*** 0.190*** 0.186*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
% Minority students -0.080** -0.079* -0.108*** -0.135*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Student-teacher  ratio -0.297 -0.409 -0.279 -0.344 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
     
Secondary school -3.280 -3.883 -2.332 -2.832 
 (0.020) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024) 
     
Charter school -2.164 -2.630 -1.025 -0.938 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) (0.036) 
     
Education  major 5.023* 4.895 3.769 3.319 
 (0.030) (0.036) (0.028) (0.036) 
     
BA degree -5.197** -3.040 -7.660*** -6.137* 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.023) (0.035) 
     
Teacher salary 0.555*** 0.560*** 0.548*** 0.558*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Current Occupation     
     
Caring for a family member -10.823*** -11.295** -10.162*** -11.025** 
 (0.040) (0.045) (0.039) (0.047) 
     
Working outside education -4.251** -4.117 -4.554* -4.677 
 (0.020) (0.027) (0.025) (0.032) 
     
Working inside education   -4.753 -4.374 
   (0.033) (0.042) 
     
Other activity -3.417* -3.746 -2.326 -2.113 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.020) (0.025) 
Reasons for leaving     
     
Financial benefits 6.717 6.645 6.391 5.109 
 (0.051) (0.062) (0.054) (0.064) 
     
Dissatisfaction with schools 8.639*** 9.169** 8.033*** 8.974** 
 (0.030) (0.040) (0.028) (0.039) 
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Pursue other positions 1.684 -0.063 1.077 0.242 
 (0.054) (0.073) (0.047) (0.072) 
     
Change in residence 4.685** 5.000* 3.846* 4.413* 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.021) (0.025) 
     
Pregnancy 5.556** 5.285* 2.883 1.989 
 (0.025) (0.030) (0.032) (0.033) 
     
Contract not renewed -0.703 -0.263   
 (0.026) (0.030)   
State unemployment rate 1.411 1.364 1.436 1.119 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) 
     
Teacher median wage 0.087 -0.068 -0.228 -0.539 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
State median wage -0.916 -0.434 -0.531 0.158 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) 
     
State FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 890 890 770 770 
Note: All regression coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. Clustered standard 
errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
A large body of research has examined the career choices of current teachers (Boyd et al. 
2005b, Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin 2004b). Little is known, however, on the labor supply 
decisions of former teachers and the factors that affect their likelihood of returning to the 
teaching profession. This is surprising given that former teachers represent an important source 
of teacher supply in the United States. In 2011-12, for example. Former teachers represented 49 
percent of teachers entering the teaching workforce (Sutcher, Darling-Hammond, and Carver-
Thomas 2016). 
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This paper examines the demographic characteristics and career paths of former teachers 
in addition to the factors that affect their decisions to return to the teaching profession. I use a 
restricted-use data from the Beginning Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS) that follows a cohort 
of first-time teachers for five years, starting from school year 2007-08. The results from this 
paper suggest that former teachers who work in large schools, high schools, and schools with 
large percentages of minority students are less likely to return to teaching after their initial exit. 
There is also some evidence that high-paid teachers are more likely to re-enter teaching. A one-
thousand-dollar increase in school salary increases the likelihood of returning to teaching by 0.5 
percentage points. The findings also indicate that former teachers who currently care for a family 
member or work outside the field of education are less likely to return to teaching. Teachers who 
left schools because of pregnancy or change in residence are also more likely to re-enter the 
profession. 
The findings from this chapter should be interpreted with cautious for several reasons. 
First, the BTLS survey targets early career teachers only. Therefore, the results may not be 
generalizable to teachers who decide to leave the profession in their mid or late-careers. Second, 
given that teachers in the sample started their careers in 2007-08, their decisions to whether or 
not to leave/return to teaching may have been affected by the 2008 recession. For example, some 
teachers who planned to leave their jobs may have decided to stay given the limited alternative 
job opportunities during the recession. Those who decided to leave may have also been affected 
by the recession. For instance, the recession may have affected the types of occupations that 
former teachers had after their initial exit, the likelihood of their return to the teaching 
profession, and the length of time between their initial exit and return to teaching. Third, the 
BTLS survey followed teachers for only five years after they started their careers in 2007-08. 
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Therefore, the analysis in this chapter doesn’t include teachers who left teaching after the first 5 
years of their careers or those who decided to return to teaching after 4 years of their initial exit. 
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
Over the last few years, enrollment in education programs in the U.S. has declined 
substantially. Between 2009 and 2015, the number of students attending teacher preparation 
programs decreased by more than 40 percent. This decline is consistent across both traditional 
and alternative education programs (U.S. Department of Education 2016). It is also part of a 
long-term decline in individuals’ interest in pursuing teaching as a career. Data from the 
Integrated Postsecondary Education System shows that between 1996 and 2016, the share of 
undergraduate students enrolled in education programs decreased by 35 percent nationally, from 
12 percent to 8 percent. During the same period, the share of undergraduate degrees awarded in 
education programs decreased by 47 percent. 
The factors driving the decreased interest in teaching are still largely unknown. 
Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests the rise of school accountability, cuts in school funding, 
and the decline in the status of teaching as a middle class career might be responsible for the 
sharp decrease in teacher supply (Byrd-Blake et al. 2010, Clotfelter et al. 2004, Cohen and 
Gebeloff 2018, Heinrich 2015, Ladd 2017). For example, some school officials believe that 
policies that emphasize high stakes testing and link teachers’ evaluation to student performance 
have made teaching less stable and more political. These policies, according to these officials, 
undermine the perception of teaching as a stable career, discouraging individuals from entering 
the teaching profession (Sawchuk and Yettick 2014, Westervelt 2015). 
Despite this anecdotal evidence, the empirical evidence on the factors that affect 
individuals’ decisions to enter the teaching profession is limited. Most of the current literature 
focuses on the supply decisions of current teachers. The findings from this research suggest that 
student demographic and socio-economic characteristics, teacher quality, and early-career 
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experience are key determinants of teacher mobility and retention (Feng and Sass 2017, 
Goldhaber, Gross, and Player 2011, Guarino, Santibañez, and Daley 2006, Hanushek, Kain, and 
Rivkin 2004a, Imazeki 2005, Johnson, Berg, and Donaldson 2005, Kirby, Berends, and Naftel 
1999, Krieg 2006, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff 2002, Loeb, Darling-Hammond, and Luczak 
2005, Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner 2007). Little attention, however, has been paid to the 
supply decisions of teacher candidates. 
In this dissertation, I examine the effects of government policy on the supply decisions of 
teacher candidates and former teachers. Over the last two decades, several states have 
implemented policies that seek to enhance students’ academic achievement. Some of these 
policies, such as school accountability, focus on improving the quality of current teachers by 
linking teacher pay and evaluation to students’ performance on standardized exams. Other 
policies, such as teacher prep performance assessment, have targeted teacher candidates in 
education programs. Critics argue that these policies adopt a very narrow view of teaching that 
emphasizes standardized testing and overlooks other aspects of teaching that are hard to 
test/quantify. These policies also, according to this view, put more pressure on teachers and 
schools without providing them with enough support needed to improve student outcomes, 
which may result in adverse effects on teacher morale and undermines teaching as an attractive 
career. 
Opponents of school accountability and performance assessment policies also point to the 
increasing dissatisfaction among teachers and teacher shortages as adverse effects of these 
policies. For example, according to a recent survey, more than half of teachers (51 percent) 
reported feeling under great stress several days a week in 2012 compared to 36 percent in 1985 
and the number of teachers saying they are satisfied with their jobs declined by 23 percentage 
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points between 2008 and 2012, from 62 percent to 39 percent (MetLife Inc., 2013). Teachers 
have also become more vocal in expressing their dissatisfaction with the current conditions of 
their schools. Thousands of teachers across several states have protested the lack of funding for 
their schools by walking out of their schools and/or organizing strikes during the last few months 
(Cohen and Gebeloff 2018). Teachers in West Virginia, for instance, organized a 9-day strike, 
demanding higher wages and better benefits (Bidgood 2018).   
Although a large body of research explores the effects of school accountability policies 
on student achievement and teacher mobility and retention, little examines whether these policies 
discourage individuals from pursuing teaching as a career. There is also limited evidence on the 
effects of teacher preparation programs on students’ decisions to enter the teaching profession, 
i.e., whether requirements for teacher preparation programs affect individuals’ decisions to enter 
teaching. 
This dissertation contributes to the small number of studies on teacher supply by 
examining the effects of school accountability and pre-service performance assessment on the 
supply decisions of teacher candidates. In the second chapter of this dissertation, I examine 
whether the introduction of NCLB in 2002 has affected enrollment and degrees awarded in 
education programs. Using data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System 
combined with data from the Current Population Survey, I find that NCLB had no effects on 
either enrollment or degrees awarded in education programs. There is some evidence, however, 
that NCLB reduced the percentage of minority students enrolled in education majors by more 
than 3 percentage points. These findings have major policy implications. While there is no 
evidence that NCLB has affected overall enrollment in education programs, the evidence from 
this chapter indicates that NCLB has large negative effects on minority enrollment in these 
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programs. This suggests that the consequences of school accountability systems may extend 
beyond the direct impact on student achievement or teacher mobility and retention. 
The third chapter examines whether requiring teacher candidates to pass a performance 
assessment test in order to be certified affects their college outcomes. Using administrative data 
on students who started their postsecondary education in the state of Georgia between 2008-09 
and 2016-17, I examine whether the introduction of the edTPA performance assessment in 
Georgia has affected students’ persistence in college, attrition from college major, or graduation 
within 4 years. The findings suggest that the edTPA assessment has no effects on college 
outcomes of students in education programs relative to other students. These findings are robust 
across different specifications and subgroups of college students. 
In the fourth chapter, I examine the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of 
teachers who leave the profession in addition to their career paths. I also examine the factors that 
affect their decisions to return to the teaching profession. I use restricted-use data from the 
Beginning Teacher Longitudinal Study that follows a cohort of first-time teachers for five years, 
starting from 2007-08. The results suggest that about one quarter of teachers leave the profession 
during the first 5 years of their career. A large portion of those who leave teaching (38 percent) 
exit after the first year. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a large portion of teachers who leave 
the profession exit for non-family related reasons. For example, only 18 percent of former 
teachers reported leaving teaching because of pregnancy or to care for a child. The findings also 
indicate that former teachers who work in large schools, high schools, and schools with large 
percentages of minority students are less likely to return to teaching after their initial exit. There 
is also some evidence that high-paid teachers are more likely to re-enter teaching. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: States with Accountability Systems Prior to NCLB 
State Year 
Illinois 1992 
Wisconsin 1993 
Texas 1994 
Indiana 1995 
Kansas 1995 
Kentucky 1995 
North Carolina 1996 
Nevada 1996 
Oklahoma 1996 
Alabama 1997 
Rhode Island 1997 
West Virginia 1997 
Delaware 1998 
Massachusetts 1998 
Michigan 1998 
New Mexico 1998 
New York 1998 
Virginia 1998 
Arkansas 1999 
California 1999 
Connecticut 1999 
Florida 1999 
Louisiana 1999 
Maryland 1999 
South Carolina 1999 
Vermont 1999 
Georgia 2000 
Oregon 2000 
Tennessee 2000 
Alaska 2001 
Source. Dee and Jacob. (2011). 
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Table A2: Share of Teacher Candidates Enrolled in Alternative Certification Programs in 2012 
State % 
Alabama 23.3 
Alaska 2.3 
Arizona 1.8 
Arkansas 26.9 
California 9.2 
Colorado 3.1 
Connecticut 5.1 
Delaware 4.0 
District of Columbia 49.2 
Florida 21.4 
Georgia 4.9 
Hawaii 29.6 
Idaho 2.2 
Illinois 3.8 
Indiana 9.5 
Iowa 0.1 
Kansas 2.9 
Kentucky 8.3 
Louisiana 45.7 
Maine 7.6 
Maryland 8.0 
Massachusetts 3.1 
Michigan 0.3 
Minnesota 0.0 
Mississippi 1.5 
Missouri 30.2 
Montana 10.9 
Nebraska 4.5 
Nevada 0.5 
New Hampshire 10.0 
New Jersey 10.1 
New Mexico 7.8 
New York 23.0 
North Carolina 6.1 
North Dakota 33.5 
Ohio 0.0 
Oklahoma 0.0 
Oregon 7.1 
Pennsylvania 0.0 
Puerto Rico 4.1 
Rhode Island 1.8 
South Carolina 12.0 
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South Dakota 1.0 
Tennessee 16.4 
Texas 36.0 
Utah 3.3 
Vermont 12.8 
Virginia 3.3 
Washington 5.2 
West Virginia 1.2 
Wisconsin 2.6 
Wyoming 0.0 
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Table A3: edTPA Participation across States 
State Participation Stage Institutions 
Alabama Policy in Place 27 
Arizona State Participating in edTPA 4 
Arkansas Policy in Place 8 
California Policy in Place 49 
Colorado State Participating in edTPA 4 
Connecticut Taking Steps Toward Implementation 18 
Delaware Policy in Place 5 
District of Columbia State Participating in edTPA 1 
Florida State Participating in edTPA 5 
Georgia Policy in Place 65 
Hawaii Policy in Place 6 
Idaho State Participating in edTPA 2 
Illinois Policy in Place 61 
Indiana State Participating in edTPA 16 
Iowa Policy in Place 21 
Kentucky State Participating in edTPA 1 
Louisiana State Participating in edTPA 1 
Maryland State Participating in edTPA 15 
Michigan State Participating in edTPA 7 
Minnesota Policy in Place 31 
Nebraska State Participating in edTPA 2 
New Jersey Policy in Place 35 
New York Policy in Place 107 
North Carolina Policy in Place 36 
Ohio Taking Steps Toward Implementation 53 
Oklahoma State Participating in edTPA 8 
Oregon Policy in Place 18 
Pennsylvania State Participating in edTPA 16 
Rhode Island State Participating in edTPA 2 
South Carolina Policy in Place 2 
South Dakota State Participating in edTPA 1 
Tennessee Policy in Place 40 
Texas State Participating in edTPA 5 
Utah State Participating in edTPA 4 
Vermont State Participating in edTPA 1 
Virginia State Participating in edTPA 5 
Washington Policy in Place 26 
West Virginia Policy in Place 11 
Wisconsin Policy in Place 45 
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Wyoming State Participating in edTPA 1 
Source: edTPA. Participation Map. Available at: http://edtpa.aacte.org/state-policy 
Note: The table includes three groups of states: a) states with policy in place, i.e., states that have already 
implemented the edTPA assessment; b) states that have at least one teacher preparation that is exploring 
adopting the edTPA assessment; and c) states that are taking steps towards implementation, i.e., 
considering a state-wide implementation of the edTPA assessment. 
 
 
Table A4: Effects of Performance Assessment after Excluding the 2012-13 Cohort from the 
Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
College 
Persistence 
Change of 
Major 
Graduation 
Within 4 Years 
        
Education major 0.0288*** -0.0819*** 0.0563*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0144) (0.0095) 
Performance assessment -0.1372*** -0.0277 0.0251* 
 (0.0155) (0.0181) (0.0141) 
Education major * performance assessment 0.0183 -0.0422 0.0181 
 (0.0160) (0.0259) (0.0191) 
Minority 0.0081 -0.0312*** -0.0066 
 (0.0075) (0.0068) (0.0101) 
Female 0.0251*** 0.0282** 0.0685*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0109) (0.0105) 
Year of birth  0.0069*** 0.0003 0.0051* 
 (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0025) 
In-state resident 0.0983*** 0.0753*** -0.0294*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0212) (0.0085) 
HS GPA 0.2048*** 0.0228 0.1729*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0136) (0.0124) 
HS graduation year  -0.0003 0.0073** -0.0083*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0028) 
Total financial aid (1st year) 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Eligible for Pell grant (1st yesr) -0.0535*** -0.0117 -0.0410*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0070) (0.0040) 
Cohort FE YES YES YES 
Institution FE YES YES YES 
Observations 152,480 152,480 152,480 
R-squared 0.1504 0.0587 0.1734 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table A5: Average Marginal Effects from the Propensity Score Equation 
  
VARIABLES Education Major 
  
Minority -0.0341*** 
 (0.0011) 
Female 0.0649*** 
 (0.0012) 
In state resident 0.0447*** 
 (0.0024) 
HS GPA -0.0207*** 
 (0.0010) 
Year of birth -0.0015** 
 (0.0006) 
HS graduation year 0.0006 
 (0.0007) 
Total financial aid -0.0085** 
 (0.0040) 
Eligible for Pell grant 0.0001*** 
 -0.0085** 
Institution FE YES 
Cohort FE YES 
Observations 252,291 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table A6: Non-linear Effects 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Probit Discrete Time 
Hazard 
   
Female 0.374 1.408 
 (0.023) (0.027) 
White 1.238 0.506 
 (0.026) (0.031) 
Age -0.203** -0.224** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Alternative certification -1.603 -1.411 
 (0.026) (0.033) 
School enrollment 0.006 -0.167 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
School enrollment squared 0.000 0.008 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
% Minority teachers 0.219** 0.234** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Minority teachers squared -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
% Minority students -0.073 -0.060 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Minority students squared  -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Student-teacher ratio -0.624 -0.872 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Student-teacher ratio squared 0.015 0.021 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Secondary school -2.805 -3.148 
 (0.017) (0.022) 
Charter school -2.584 -3.071 
 (0.026) (0.028) 
Education  major 2.926 2.771 
 (0.025) (0.032) 
BA degree -6.618*** -5.704** 
 (0.017) (0.024) 
Teacher salary 0.523*** 0.543*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Caring for a family member -9.552*** -10.355*** 
 (0.033) (0.037) 
Working outside education -4.274*** -4.409** 
 (0.016) (0.022) 
Working inside education -1.640 -1.323 
 (0.022) (0.027) 
Other reasons -1.230 -0.754 
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 (0.017) (0.021) 
Financial benefits 5.716 5.498 
 (0.051) (0.065) 
Dissatisfaction with schools 7.014*** 7.471** 
 (0.024) (0.032) 
Pursue other positions 2.050 1.511 
 (0.043) (0.062) 
Change in residence 4.259** 4.477* 
 (0.021) (0.023) 
Pregnancy 4.851** 4.703 
 (0.024) (0.029) 
Contract not renewed -0.256 -0.227 
 (0.021) (0.024) 
State unemployment rate 1.077 0.954 
 (0.010) (0.012) 
Teacher median wage -0.051 -0.138 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
State median wage -0.799 -0.535 
 (0.014) (0.017) 
   
State FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Observations 1,130 1,130 
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Figure A1: Percentage of Individuals Who Attended/Completed Alternative Certification Programs (2000-2015) 
Source: U.S. Department of Education. Higher Education Act Title II State Report Card System. 
 
 
Figure A2: Standardized Bias across Covariates Before and After Matching 
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Figure A3: Share of Leavers by Survey Wave 
Note: This figure presents the share of former teachers who left teaching during each wave, out of all leavers. 
 
 
Figure A4: Share of Returners by Survey Wave 
Note: This figure shows the share of former teachers who returned to teaching during each wave, out of all 
leavers. 
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Figure A5: Share of Former Teachers Who Left due to Contract Non-Renewal 
Note: This figure shows the share of former teachers who left due to contract non-renewal during each wave, out 
of all leavers. 
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